Korean conflict: The lesson from America’s ‘lost war’
Examiner Editorial
July 26, 2009
It was 56-years ago today that the U.S. and North Korea signed the armistice that ended active combat in America’s forgotten war. More than 36,000 Americans gave their lives defending South Korea from invasion first by the communist North and then by the Red Chinese Army. While the war itself is not often recalled these days, battles such as the Inchon Landing, Chosin Reservoir and Pork Chop Hill became emblazoned in U.S. military history. The armistice established the 148 mile-long Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which runs north of the 38th parallel separating the two countries. Some 700,000 North Korean soldiers are arrayed along the DMZ, with thousands of artillery pieces, capable of destroying Seoul, the thriving South Korean capital that is just 25 miles away. The U.S. maintains a force of approximately 38,000 soldiers just south of the DMZ. Since the armistice was signed, 90 Americans have died in skirmishes along the DMZ.
The harsh reality is that war could resume at any time. South Korea never signed the armistice and North Korea disavowed it earlier this year, just a few days after conducting its latest round of nuclear tests. The communist regime has also test-fired missiles in recent months capable of reaching Japan and possibly U.S. territory. A mis-reading of intentions by either side today could have calamitous consequences, just as it did in the days leading up to the original conflict. And therein lies the lesson: Official U.S. policy toward aggression by the Soviet Union and Communist China wasn’t clear after the end of World War II in 1945 until an anonymous article appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs in 1947. The article advanced a doctrine of containment by the U.S. of communist expansion, which became official U.S. policy under President Truman.
But the article – later revealed to have been written by George Kennan, a career State Department official – was vague about what the U.S. would do in response to communist expansion in areas other than Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin assumed that meant the U.S. would not oppose invasion of South Korea by his puppet communist regime in the north. The lesson for today is clear: Bad things happen in the world when there is uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to defend freedom against aggression. There should be no surprise that tensions have been rising on the Korean peninsula for more than a decade because during that period the U.S. has wavered between tough rhetoric and offering concession after concession in an effort to bribe the North to give up its nuclear weapons program. We already know where that road leads.
