James Zumwalt: Imbalance of power emboldens Iran and North Korea

Iran and North Korea are two rogue states determined to destabilize the world by joining the nuclear arms club. Their efforts illustrate this fact: Where there is imbalance, the potential for danger always exists.

In Nature, such imbalance can occur with devastating consequences. In government, our Founding Fathers recognized a need to maintain balance, giving rise to the Constitutional mandate for three separate but equal branches. But in countries like Iran and North Korea, imbalance helps them maintain their power base.

Kim Jong Il inherited from his father a government with power balanced equally between the Party and military. The son's accession to power and inexperience created a temporary power vacuum.

Senior army officers moved quickly to fill it. Sensing the son's insecurities, the army played to his ego.

Military bases competed to see which could render Kim Jong Il the greatest honors. This led to a "military first" policy, creating an imbalance in governmental power by which the army took priority over the Party.

Senior military officers provide Kim Jong Il with a tainted view of reality and a grand perception of self. The North Korean strongman takes counsel from officers devoid of combat experience--always a danger as those ignorant of the horrors of war tend to glorify it. Simultaneously, Kim Jong Il plays to his generals' machismo by showing no fear over threatening the outside world.

Today, the North Korean army is top-heavy. In the first decade of his rule, the son promoted more officers to general rank than his father did in a half century. A dictatorial state burdened with a top-heavy military greatly increases the potential for generating internal conflict--one which could easily transition into an external one.

All these factors, plus Pyongyang's ailing economy and inability to feed its own people, create a volatile mix capable of triggering war.

In Iran, we see a similar evolution. Extremist mullahs have ruled for thirty years, assisted by both civilian government and military authority. But neither group had control over the other.

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, this relationship changed. Closely affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq war, Ahmadinejad valued their loyalty and brutality.

He began bringing IRGC officers into government and also placing them at the head of state-owned companies. Under previous Iranian presidents, mullahs enjoyed the riches from state's enterprises receiving lucrative contracts; now senior IRGC officers do.

And, while the IRGC's allegiance is supposed to be solely to the country's top cleric-the "Supreme Leader"-under Ahmadinejad, the president now shares their loyalty as well. This loyalty to Ahmadinejad became evident during the June 12 post-presidential election riots.

It is because of this imbalance the IRGC, usually silent about politics, brazenly expressed a commitment to keeping Ahmadinejad in office. It is because of this imbalance the IRGC was called in to quell domestic violence on the streets of Tehran--violence stemming from a stolen election, human rights abuses and a downward spiraling domestic economy. It is because of this imbalance the IRGC today maintains control over Iran's nuclear facilities--and will eventually take control of the finished product.

In Iran's theocracy, the Supreme Leader's word is law. In an extraordinary rebuff of the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad--emboldened by the IRGC's split loyalty--rejected the top cleric's call to fire the man Ahmadinejad had just appointed as his vice president.

The power imbalance in both Iran and North Korea has clearly emboldened these leaders. In taking advice from a military with an inflated image of its role in the country's destiny, these leaders may need little encouragement to initiate regional conflict.

James Zumwalt , a Marine veteran of the Vietnam and Gulf wars who writes often on national security and defense issues, is the author of "Bare Feet, Iron Will: Stories from the Other Side of Vietnam's Battlefields" (found at: www.jgzumwalt.com).