Will Russia’s new Khabarovsk submarine pose a new challenge to NATO? Yes. Will it pose a game-changing challenge? No.
I note this in light of the Khabarovsk‘s upcoming sea trials. Originally scheduled for the end of June, the trials have been delayed to an as-yet-undetermined date. Considering the submarine’s central role in Vladimir Putin’s strategic weapons policy, however, it will be deployed as soon as is feasible. Evincing as much, Russian officials have been gleeful in their announcements as to the submarine’s looming activity.
What does this mean for NATO and America?
The excellent submarine warfare analyst H.I. Sutton suggests that “this is likely to be the defining submarine of the 2020s because it represents a novel and difficult adversary.” Sutton points out that the Khabarovsk will be armed with Russia’s Poseidon/Kanyon nuclear armed and powered unmanned torpedo system. That torpedo system is designed for the destruction of American cities and naval bases during wartime.
I’m less concerned.
While the Khabarovsk is more impressive than the other submarines in Russia’s fleet, it won’t alter the balance of power.
First off, the Khabarovsk shares the basic hull design and acoustic signatures as Russia’s Borei-class ballistic missile submarines. While the Borei-class has advanced the Russian strategic threat beyond late Soviet-era capabilities, it remains inferior to American, British, and French submarine forces. The Borei‘s acoustic signature has been fixed by the U.S. Navy, and its class can be shadowed while the submarines are underway. The same will apply to the Khabarovsk as soon as it begins its sea trials proximate to the Barents Sea.
Nor is the Khabarovsk‘s employment of the Poseidon nuclear system a critical challenge.
That system is designed to undermine NATO’s strategic nuclear posture by operating in between full-scale nuclear war and conventional conflict. Fortunately, the United States has improved its ability to deal with this threat. That’s primarily due to the Trump administration’s development of nuclear counterforces, including submarine-launched weapons, which can match Russia in the limited nuclear warfare domain.
That said, more could be done to establish deterrence here. President Trump (or, should he win, President Joe Biden) should make clear that any Russian nuclear strike on the American mainland (whether targeting a city or naval base) will result in escalated nuclear retaliation against Russian mainland targets. Putin knows that he would lose a full-scale nuclear war with America, so establishing clear deterrence-escalation red lines is crucial for the U.S.
There’s one final point to note here.
Russia is being clever with its intense resource focus on undersea warfare. Recent years have seen the Russian Navy significantly improve its operational tempo and range of action undersea. This includes Moscow’s practiced ability to disrupt communication cables and to surge ballistic missile submarines into the Atlantic Ocean at short notice.
The U.S. should learn from this example.
While the U.S. Navy retains undersea supremacy for the moment, the admiralty’s procurement focus remains far too rigid. Were the Navy’s higher ranks in possession of more original thinkers along the lines of John Paul Jones and Horatio Nelson, they would have dramatically scaled back aircraft carrier operations. In their place, they would be investing far greater resources in newer and more undersea sensor and combat platforms, both manned and unmanned.
Sadly, it’s likely to take a war with China and a ballistic missile-smashed carrier flight deck for them to wake up.
Until then, the top line is clear: America retains the undersea advantage for the meantime, but it may not last.
