There is an easy way to read Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to host Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi in Ankara on July 28, and to call the visit “historic”: as an energy story, a pipeline story, a story about barrels and stakes. That reading is not wrong, but simply incomplete.
For two decades, Turkey’s dealings with Baghdad focused on strategizing against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party — a separatist Kurdish entity intent on seceding territory from Turkey, conducting cross-border raids, and maintaining a network of bases holding no fewer than 4,000 Turkish troops across Erbil, Duhok, and Nineveh. That narrow, security-first relationship is being folded into something much more expansive, and Iraq’s Kurds are not reassured: a courtship of Baghdad, quietly encouraged by Washington’s own envoy Tom Barrack, to the region is widely felt in Kurdish circles to come at their expense.
