What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of North Korea? Most likely, it is missiles. News that North Korea has launched a missile is no longer extraordinary.
Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, short-range projectiles — the names and types vary, but the sheer fact that Pyongyang has tested another weapon no longer shocks South Korean society. Yet, if we trap our understanding of North Korean military threats within the familiar image of the missile, we may fail to grasp North Korea’s transformation properly. North Korean military power is moving in a new direction.
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Beyond missiles, drones, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and unmanned systems are emerging as new areas of focus for the North Korean military. And this is not merely a matter of adding a few new weapons. It means the very nature of warfare is changing.
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From Aug. 17-27, South Korea and the United States will conduct their annual joint exercise, Ulchi Freedom Shield. Notably, this year’s exercise incorporates responses to novel forms of attack, including drones, GPS jamming, and cyber assaults, reflecting evolving North Korean threats. U.S. military officials have also pointed out that North Korea is accumulating combat experience through the war in Ukraine, marking another critical shift in the security environment.
This poses a fundamental question: Is North Korea still preparing for war only in the traditional way? It is highly unlikely.
The face of modern warfare is changing rapidly. The war in Ukraine is the most dramatic illustration of this shift. While tanks, artillery, fighter jets, and missiles remain crucial, countless small drones are simultaneously being deployed for reconnaissance and attacks. A new paradigm has emerged in which battlefields are reshaped not by a single expensive, high-tech weapon, but by the mass deployment of relatively inexpensive unmanned systems. Pyongyang is watching this transformation closely.
Last July, U.S. defense analysts noted that North Korea is learning the value of drone warfare from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, increasing its utilization of small battlefield drones and one-way attack drones. Possibilities have also been raised that Russian support could help North Korea produce and advance these weapon systems.
This is not something to be taken lightly. North Korea already boasts one of the largest artillery forces in the world and continues to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. If Pyongyang combines these with drone capabilities, electronic warfare, and cyber warfare, the character of a potential conflict could look drastically different from the past.
The Korean Peninsula war we once imagined resembled massive armies crossing the Demilitarized Zone — tanks rolling, artillery opening fire, and fighter jets filling the skies. Future warfare, however, may not begin that way. Communications networks could falter before a single shot is fired. GPS might stop functioning properly. Cyberattacks could paralyze critical institutional systems, and countless small drones could fill the skies. Only then might the familiar missiles and artillery arrive.
This is the “North Korea beyond missiles” that we must confront. North Korea’s new military threats do not stem solely from larger, more expensive weaponry. Rather, the real complexity arises when cheap, small, easily mass-produced weapons combine with existing military frameworks. For instance, if dozens or hundreds of drones approach simultaneously, the defending side must handle each drone as an individual threat. The attacker uses relatively inexpensive hardware, while the defender may be forced to deploy vastly expensive detection and interception systems. The economics of warfare itself are shifting.
Such a transformation is particularly appealing to North Korea. Pyongyang is not an economically affluent nation, making it difficult to secure military parity with the U.S. or South Korea through traditional means. Consequently, North Korea relies on asymmetric capabilities that are relatively inexpensive yet impose heavy burdens on adversaries. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were prime examples. Now, drones, electronic warfare, and cyber warfare are being added to that list.
More importantly, North Korea is not merely observing these changes in peacetime. Its military cooperation with Russia serves as a window for firsthand experience.
Analysis suggests that North Korean troop deployments to the war in Ukraine have provided opportunities to witness modern warfare on an actual battlefield. U.S. and South Korean military authorities are closely monitoring how this combat experience could translate into enhanced North Korean military capabilities. War is the most brutal textbook for any military; it teaches lessons that training grounds cannot replicate.
Which weapons actually prove effective, which tactics fail, how to respond when communications are cut, and how to operate and defend against drones — all of these experiences remain enduring military assets long after a war ends. This is why military cooperation with Russia means far more to Pyongyang than a simple transaction of trading shells and personnel for economic returns. North Korea may currently be learning through war. And we cannot ignore the possibility that the fruits of those lessons will eventually return to the Korean Peninsula.
What, then, must South Korea do? The first step is to acknowledge the changing nature of warfare. Explaining North Korean threats solely through the dual keywords of “nuclear weapons” and “missiles” is no longer sufficient. While nukes and missiles remain Pyongyang’s most vital strategic assets, an era is arriving where they alone cannot define North Korea’s military posture. South Korea is evolving as well. In its defense blueprint, the Republic of Korea’s military has designated unmanned systems and artificial intelligence as core pillars of future warfare, pursuing the acquisition of large-scale military drones and manned-unmanned teaming systems. This is not simply about keeping pace with North Korea; it reflects the reality that the environment of warfare itself has changed, requiring our military forces to transform accordingly. The military of the future will no longer consist solely of human personnel. It will likely comprise human command, machine reconnaissance, drone strikes, and AI analyzing vast streams of intelligence.
Consequently, South Korea’s preparations must also change. Possessing more missiles alone is not enough. We must be able to detect and neutralize drones, counter GPS jamming and electronic warfare, and safeguard core state and military systems from cyberattacks. Above all, we must establish response protocols so that neither citizens nor the military falls into chaos when novel attacks occur.
The significance of this lies in how the very concept of the “rear” will transform in future warfare. In the past, front lines and rear areas could be delineated to some degree. In a war that combines drones and cyber operations, however, locations far behind the front lines can become targets. Critical national infrastructure — such as communications facilities, airports, ports, and power plants — could come under assault. War is no longer just a matter for soldiers; our everyday lives could become the battlefield.
This does not mean we should exaggerate North Korea’s new military capabilities to stoke panic. What is required, rather, is a cool head. No matter how North Korea’s military evolves, South Korea and the U.S.-South Korea alliance are developing matching countermeasures. The critical factor is keeping pace with the velocity of change. If North Korea prepares for a new kind of war while we prepare only for the wars of the past, we will find ourselves in serious trouble. What we should fear is not simply the fact that North Korea is developing new weapons; the true danger lies in a scenario where our adversary changes while we stand still.
North Korea’s missiles remain dangerous. Its nuclear weapons are even more perilous. Yet the threats we face on the Korean Peninsula going forward may not manifest solely as a single missile. They could take the form of small drones blanketing the sky, suddenly disabled GPS systems, communications networks halting without warning, invisible cyberattacks, or a combination of them all.
Therefore, we must change the question we ask about North Korea. “What kind of missiles does North Korea possess?” is no longer a sufficient query. We must ask instead: “How does North Korea intend to fight future wars?” The moment we find the answer to that question, our perspective on North Korea’s military power will fundamentally shift.
Missiles were once the sharpest symbol of North Korea’s military might. Yet the North Korea of the future cannot be explained by missiles alone. Drones, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, cyber operations, and real-world battlefield experience are converging to forge a new form of military power. This does not mean the age of missiles is over. On the contrary — new technologies and tactics are simply being stacked on top of them.
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What we must prepare for is what comes next. It is not about guessing North Korea’s next weapon, but understanding how Pyongyang intends to fight its next war.
If we fail to see North Korea beyond missiles, we will end up looking at its present while preparing for the past. And in national security, the most dangerous mistake, as always, is preparing only for the threats we already know.
Park Joonhye is a research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. She received her Master of Arts and doctorate in politics and unification studies from the University of North Korean Studies. Her research interests include North Korean politics, military security, society and culture, nuclear policy, and unification discourse. She has published peer-reviewed articles in journals indexed by the Korea Citation Index and has written numerous newspaper and policy columns in South Korea. Her recent English opinion articles on North Korea have appeared in United Press International. Her major publication includes A Study on the Drivers of Nuclear Possession and Incentives for Nuclear Abandonment under the Kim Jong-un Regime.
