Israel: Pressure without a win

Israeli media coverage — Times of Israel, Haaretz, Israel Hayom, Ynet — tells a consistent story: Broad early support for hitting Iran’s nuclear program, missiles, and proxies has curdled into frustration with the outcome. A Times of Israel poll from the weeks after the June agreement found 92% think Iran came out ahead. A Jerusalem Post survey from the same period put the share who believe Israel won at just 15%. The numbers are months old but still shape the commentary.

The expired agreement deepened that frustration, because it left the regime and its core capabilities standing. Many Israelis want the campaign restarted or intensified, even at the cost of friction with Washington. Analysts point to a widening gap between Trump’s goals — reopen the strait, calm markets, find an exit — and Israel’s preference for finishing the job. Officials have signaled they’ll act alone if needed.

Washington: Strikes, a blockade, and a threat aimed sideways

Trump’s approach has been military and improvised at once: strikes on Iranian air defenses and coastal targets, a standing naval blockade, sanctions, and sporadic backchannel diplomacy. He has said repeatedly that he’s in no rush for a deal, that the midterm elections won’t dictate his timeline, and that Iran should simply surrender.

The sharpest moment came on Monday, when Trump told Fox News that if Oman “gets in the way” of U.S. efforts on the strait, “we’ll bomb the s*** out of them,” then added in the Oval Office that Oman hadn’t “behaved very well” but could be handled easily. It was Trump’s second public threat against Muscat since the war began, a pattern, not a slip. The remarks landed as Oman ran parallel shipping talks with Iran just as the deal window closed — some U.S. officials see Muscat as too close to Tehran. Oman’s government stayed silent, but Omani social media didn’t, pointing to years of mediation between Washington and Tehran.

The Gulf: Absorbing the cost

Gulf coverage — Al Arabiya, the National, Gulf News, Arab News — reads differently, framed around energy security, freedom of navigation, and sovereignty rather than victory or defeat. Iranian attacks on tankers, including Abu Dhabi National Oil Company vessels, and missiles reaching Emirati waters have drawn sharp condemnation from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The United Arab Emirates went furthest. After an Iranian missile landed in its territorial waters on Tuesday, Abu Dhabi suspended all trade and financial ties with Iran indefinitely. This is a real break, given how much commerce used to flow between them. Saudi Arabia has stayed more measured, condemning the attacks while keeping a diplomatic door open. Across the coverage, a common thread emerges: a region absorbing disrupted exports, higher insurance costs, and exposed infrastructure, with Iranian aggression pulling Gulf States together and irritation building toward Washington, too.

How durable that restraint remains may depend on what happens next. Another major tanker attack, a strike on Gulf infrastructure, or a sustained jump in oil prices could quickly change the political calculation. Gulf governments that now want distance from the fighting could face pressure to respond more directly, while European governments that have largely confined themselves to diplomatic support could find neutrality increasingly difficult if another Hormuz crisis begins imposing serious economic costs at home.

Iran and the wider region

Iranian state media haven’t shifted their line: America is the aggressor, the deal collapse is Washington’s fault, and Iran will keep restricting the strait until the blockade lifts, its assets are unfrozen, and Lebanon-related conditions are met. Al Jazeera’s framing, “the U.S.-Israel war on Iran,” gives those talking points airtime alongside coverage of Israeli strikes in Lebanon.

Most U.S. allies have stayed on the sidelines. Europe backs the fight against Iran’s nuclear program and its attacks on shipping in words, not with troops or basing. Gulf States still host U.S. forces and depend on American guarantees, even as the war exposes them with no end in sight. That arrangement is sustainable while the costs remain manageable. A prolonged energy shock or another attack on Gulf territory could make sitting on the sidelines considerably harder.

Where this leaves things

The United States and Israel still hold military superiority, but neither has the political room for indefinite war. Iran can’t match that firepower, but geography, proxies, and a resilience narrative let it keep imposing costs of its own, and Tehran treats mere endurance as a win.

The conflict has entered a prolonged, intermittent phase rather than approaching a conventional end. The center of gravity has shifted away from sustained direct combat between Israel and Iran and toward the Strait of Hormuz: the U.S. naval blockade and continuing military pressure on one side, Iranian attacks, threats, and efforts to impose economic costs on the other. There may be periods of relative quiet interrupted by sudden violence, but neither should be mistaken for peace or a return to all-out war.

That makes the expired peace agreement particularly important. It removed the one framework that existed for managing this new phase, raising the odds of a miscalculation neither side intends. The most immediate danger is probably at sea: Another tanker confrontation could begin with warning shots or an attempted interdiction and climb an escalation ladder remarkably quickly. Close behind is unilateral Israeli action against Iranian facilities being rebuilt, particularly if Jerusalem concludes that Washington will tolerate reconstitution rather than resume the campaign. A third pathway comes if Iran’s nuclear, missile, or air-defense rebuilding crosses a red line that either country has already decided it cannot accept.

None requires either side to choose another full-scale war. That is precisely the danger. A tactical decision at sea, an Israeli strike intended to prevent Iranian recovery, or an Iranian effort to test how much rebuilding Washington will tolerate could force decisions that political leaders have so far avoided.

There is still incentive for a face-saving Hormuz deal, given the economic pressure on Iran and mounting Gulf losses. But even such an agreement would probably manage the conflict rather than resolve it. Washington wants freedom of navigation and an exit it can defend politically. Israel wants to prevent Iran from rebuilding what six months of fighting destroyed. Tehran wants the blockade lifted and survival portrayed as victory. Those objectives remain far apart.

Views of the U.S. diverge by audience: Israel sees an essential but increasingly unreliable partner, Iran paints Washington as aggressive but constrained, and the Gulf sits exposed in between, reminded by the Oman threat how blunt an ally Washington can be.

BEATING IRAN MEANS DISMANTLING HEZBOLLAH

Six months on, this is no longer the war that began in February. It has become something potentially more durable: a prolonged, intermittent conflict centered on the Strait of Hormuz, American pressure, and Iranian retaliation, punctuated by moments when the larger war threatens to return.

No victor, no real off-ramp, and no peace. Just a conflict learning how to continue.