Argentine president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and Venezuelan leader, Nicolas Maduro, have much more in common than failing economies, populist rhetoric, and a penchant for extra-judicial political maneuvers: they are both the first and second (respectively) highest recipients of Chinese lending in Latin America—a region that, between 2005 and 2013 has received more than $100 billion in loan commitments from Beijing. As China’s economy begins to slow, however, both leaders may find another commonality to add to the list: tattered political careers.

To date, China has lent Venezuela more than $50 billion, ostensibly for infrastructure, mining, and energy projects. (Maduro is notoriously vague on where bolivar notes end up.) With OPEC in the midst of an oil war with the United States, China’s loan to Venezuela—repayable in oil—is suddenly becoming exceedingly difficult to pay back. This explains—paradoxically—why Maduro was able, during a recent visit to Beijing, to secure $20 billion in “investments” from the Chinese. Quite simply, China has financed too much to risk a Venezuelan implosion, which, with inflation rates at 64%, an economy that contracted by 2.8% in 2014, oil trading under $50 a barrel, and commodity shortages throughout the country, seems increasingly likely. In what appeared to be a last-ditch effort to revive a flagging economy, Venezuela announced this past Tuesday the creation of a new foreign-exchange market called the “Marginal Foreign-Exchange System” (or, Simadi), allowing for a free-floating exchange rate. 24 hours later, the market responded, with Venezuelan dollar-denominated bonds tumbling.