The recent OPEC+ decision to slash oil output by 2 million barrels per day has elicited outrage among U.S. policymakers and analysts. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Menendez, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, and Rep. Ro Khanna are just some of many Democrats who have pushed for a punitive response against Saudi Arabia — specifically, termination of military sales to the kingdom and withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country.
However, such interpretations of the Saudi-led move as a politically motivated stab-in-the-back, and as “siding” with Moscow in its invasion of Ukraine, overlook trends in the global energy market behind the recent OPEC+ decision. COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have both led to significant volatility in the price of oil and uncertainty over demand over the past few years, and many oil exporters have been struggling recently to meet their output targets. Moreover, the Saudis and other producers were voicing concerns over underinvestment in fossil fuels and dwindling spare capacity well before President Joe Biden’s trip to Jeddah earlier this summer.
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Given how many of the GCC countries have experienced difficulty in the past with balancing their budgets to achieve their respective “Vision” programs, it is not surprising that Riyadh would have acted preemptively to safeguard itself from the proposed price cap on Russian oil by keeping prices high and stable.
These criticisms are also rooted in a less-than-accurate framing of the U.S.-Saudi relationship as an exchange of “oil for security.” This view not only neglects important diplomatic and geopolitical dimensions of the partnership — counterterrorism cooperation, containing revisionist powers such as Iran, preserving regional stability, progress on social liberalization, and promoting normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states — but also leads to treatment of Riyadh as a “client” state and a “big gas station” by U.S. officials.
On past occasions, the Saudis have pumped extra oil to keep markets stable, for example, during the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, the Arab Spring, after the United States tightened sanctions on Iran in 2018, and today by replacing Russian oil exports to Europe. But they did not do so solely due to U.S. pressure. Rather, such policies aligned with Riyadh’s own long-term economic and strategic interests.
At other times, American and Saudi energy priorities have diverged, particularly since the U.S. “Shale Revolution.” Although both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia benefit from stability in global energy markets, their interests will not always align, and they do not align right now.
Even within the simplistic “oil for security” paradigm, the Saudis would argue that Washington hasn’t followed through on its side of the bargain in recent years. This perception of American retrenchment in the region was reinforced by Washington’s reluctance to intervene decisively during the Syrian civil war, reduction of military support to help allies defend themselves from Iran and its regional proxies, pursuit of a deal that would lift sanctions on Tehran, and the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. Biden’s vow to make the kingdom a “pariah” further damaged the already-faltering relationship between the two countries.
Finally, even without the OPEC+ production cuts, the proposed price cap on Russian oil would have faced other major challenges.
Coercive measures can easily backfire. The Gulf states may respond with their own escalatory moves, for instance, by further increasing oil prices, moving to denominate the oil trade in yuan, or expanding military agreements with China to compensate for the loss of U.S. assistance. Such a move would also inevitably embolden Iran, a far more malevolent actor in terms of both its regional ambitions and its enabling of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression.
In short, the harsh responses proposed by some U.S. lawmakers risk jeopardizing the U.S.-Saudi relationship altogether, without achieving any meaningful progress in ending the Russo-Ukrainian war or bringing down oil prices. Riyadh is unlikely to respond well to public ostracism and “naming-and-shaming” and would not want to be seen as caving in to American pressure.
A better solution for Biden would be to offer the Saudis firm and concrete commitments to contain and roll back Iranian influence in the region. In return, the kingdom should understand the value of crippling Putin’s war effort in alleviating international tensions, including in the Middle East and North Africa. Another important takeaway for Riyadh should be the sensitivity of great power rivalry concerns to the U.S. as tensions with China and Russia escalate. Although some Saudi cooperation with Moscow and Beijing is inevitable in an increasingly multipolar world, Washington can still try to prevent these ties from evolving into broader strategic partnerships.
Even with this more measured approach, there is no guarantee that the kingdom will reverse course on the OPEC+ decision. But in the long run, prudent diplomacy is certainly a better option than the alternatives. Trying to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” ultimately failed the first time; it won’t work a second time, either.
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Niranjan Shankar is a writer based in Atlanta.
