A senior Chinese People’s Liberation Army officer, Lt. Gen. He Lei, penned an article explaining why China’s Korean War experience should guide its modern military strategy toward the United States.
The executive officer of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, He is a known hard-liner on Taiwan and the U.S. In his present assignment, the general is responsible for training PLA officers and strategy development. His words carry weight both for what they say about evolving PLA doctrine and their influence on Beijing’s Central Military Commission. His arguments are certainly forward-leaning, referencing the PLA’s rising expectation that it will have to fight a near-term war with either the U.S., Taiwan, or both.
Beginning with a creative history of the Korean War, He explains that Mao Zedong’s deployment of the PLA against the U.S. military in North Korea shattered “the myth that U.S. imperialism is invincible.” Here, we see a presentation of the U.S. military as a force that can be both contested and defeated. The centrality of the Korean War to the Chinese military psyche takes on significant importance in the context of three factors. First, the war is seen as a necessary defense of the motherland against a great external threat. Second, the PLA has limited post-Korean War experience of major conflict. Third, China views the outcome of that war as being broadly in its favor. Taken together, He thus uses the Korean War to reinforce the idea that China can take on a more powerful foe and triumph.
The general then inadvertently outlines China’s greatest weakness: its autocratic leadership, outside the scrutiny that a democratic system offers. “We should always bear in mind the incomparable strength and correct leadership of the [Chinese Communist Party] and the significant advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.” This absolute deference to Xi Jinping is demanded, but it restricts opportunities for necessary introspection within the regime. China’s ultimate undoing will be of its own making.
Next, He is on to the three main takeaways of the Korean War for China’s contemporary security strategy.
The first is that the Korean War was fought “to safeguard national security interests and actively carry out international struggles.” The general says that the position of U.S. ground forces along the Yalu River represented an existential threat to China. Here, we see a not-so-subtle reference to China’s red-line warning against U.S. military forces being deployed to Taiwan. Deeply paranoid about that possibility, the PLA and senior Communist Party leadership are mentally preparing themselves for war. America underestimates at our peril the dangerous mix of emotion and nationalism with which China views Taiwan.
He’s next two assertions are joined together. He argues that the Korean War experience teaches China to be ready “to engage in one decisive [war] to avoid being forced to fight 100 times.” The general then links this to his third contention that the Korean War laid “a solid foundation for the long-term peace and development of China.”
Here, we see the very long-term perspective with which China approaches its struggle with America. While Xi claims that China only seeks mutually beneficial trade and diplomatic dealings with the international community, the truth is that Xi seeks to replace the U.S.-led liberal international order with a feudal mercantile order in which China offers investment in return for proprietary economic rights, technology transfers, and foreign policy deference.
But if this is the long-term game plan, what He is really talking about here is the understanding in some Beijing quarters that China will have to fight at least one decisive war to cow America and influence the international community into new deference toward China. Those who ignore this aggressive expectation are not paying enough attention to how, where, and in what regard China now operates.
He’s article, then, deserves careful attention.
