America’s killing of Qassem Soleimani is a major blow to Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s regime will respond. But how?
The first point to note is that Iran will respond with a violent attack against the United States or its interests. Soleimani wasn’t simply the longtime leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ external action wing; he was that theocracy’s poster boy. Long idealized as courageous against Iran’s enemies, thoughtful in leadership, humble in life, and quietly devoted to Iran’s Khomeinist ideology, Soleimani was revered by the hardliners. Allowing Soleimani’s death to go unpunished would betray the regime’s ideology and broadcast weakness at the worse possible time.
The ideological consideration here takes root in Iran’s warped interpretation of Husayn ibn Ali’s martyrdom. The effective second Jesus of Khomeinism, Ali lost his life in a heroic 7th-century last stand against a far more powerful Sunni army. His sacrifice has been adopted by the Iranian regime as a motive for unrelenting sacrifice and struggle in God’s service. Seen to encapsulate Ali’s legacy, Soleimani’s demise cannot be tolerated without undercutting the regime’s existential purpose.
So, what will Iran do?
That ultimately depends on the supreme leader.
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Khamenei may decide to go big with an attack on U.S. soil, or against Americans abroad. Certainly, U.S. ambassadors and government officials abroad will now have their security increased against the threat of retaliatory assassination. Iran might also consider some kind of escalation in the Persian Gulf, perhaps disrupting oil tanker transits through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians would hope that such action might earn international ire for Washington. These options pose real complications, however. Though much of the focus of the U.S. media has been on the potential blowback to America, Iran has much more to lose from a major escalation.
For a start, if Iran attempts to shut the Strait of Hormuz, its navy will end up at the bottom of the Persian Gulf. And with Iran’s economy crippled by U.S. sanctions and domestic protests bubbling very near to the surface, Khamenei can ill afford a serious confrontation with America. Doing so would risk the regime itself. Note also that President Trump’s oscillation from a harsh policy towards Iran, to stated interest in high-level diplomacy, to this killing of its most revered officer will foster another Iranian fear: if we push him too far, what is Trump capable of?
This leaves Iran with lower-level options. The most likely possibility is Iran using its proxies to launch escalated rocket attacks in Iraq. But while that would show a visible response, it risks agitating the Iraqi political consensus against that nation being used as a playground by foreign powers. The same concern applies to Iran using the Lebanese Hezbollah against American or Israeli targets. Iran must balance short-term desires for revenge alongside its long-term strategy to export the revolution.
Another possibility is that Soleimani’s newly announced replacement, Ismael Qaani, will orchestrate attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Qaani has headed up the Guard’s day-to-day provision of support to Iranian interests in Afghanistan and Yemen and will want to prove himself.
Where does this leave us?
Well, with high confidence that Iran will respond but only medium confidence as to how.
