The Washington Post‘s investigative reporting on Afghanistan is instructive, but not a cause for immediate withdrawal.
To be sure, the reporting underlines nearly two decades of mismanaged U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The Post documents a sustaining chasm between what U.S. officials have been saying about Afghanistan, and what has actually been happening there.
Take its examination of massive unsupervised aid spending.
Investigative reporter Craig Whitlock notes that “By allowing corruption to fester, U.S. officials told interviewers, they helped destroy the popular legitimacy of the wobbly Afghan government they were fighting to prop up. With judges and police chiefs and bureaucrats extorting bribes, many Afghans soured on democracy and turned to the Taliban to enforce order.”
Here we see the strategic tension between what U.S. agencies were doing with their money. The CIA was paying politicians and warlords for intelligence information, the State Department and U.S. International Development Agency were paying local power brokers for often pointless construction projects (“roads to nowhere), and the Pentagon was paying many different interests to do many different things. These allocations simultaneously advanced different U.S. agency interests outside of a coordinated strategy.
The reporting also encapsulates America’s insane policy towards opium production (opium is a precursor for heroin). Alternating between buying opium crops and burning them, the United States has pushed many farmers into even stronger alliances with Taliban interests.
That said, I disagree with the Post‘s reporting in one key area: it does not adequately reflect the development of Afghan security forces. While the reporting correctly identifies the deep corruption and capability gaps that afflict too many Afghan units, it is unfair to suggest that “after almost two decades of help from Washington, the Afghan army and police are still too weak to fend off the Taliban, the Islamic State, and other insurgents without U.S. military backup.”
The most capable Afghan forces can now defeat adversary forces with U.S. military air support. Afghan forces have also conducted a successful campaign against ISIS forces. Afghan special forces, in particular, have taken hundreds of casualties to secure their country and deserve more credit for it.
Here are the key takeaways from the report. Obvious and serious challenges remain. But we must not make policy on the back of guilt over former mistakes. We must make policy on the basis of what best serves American interests now. And U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is rightly focused on securing major cities, building Afghan security capability, and countering international terrorist groups. The strategy is not focused on patrolling through Helmand province or along the restive Afghan-Pakistani border. At the same time, U.S.-Taliban negotiations are continuing, calibrated to the Taliban’s willingness to live up to its word. We thus have a dual military-political track that offers real prospects of progress (yes, Pakistan remains a problem).
Moreover, what’s the alternative?
Total withdrawal would create physical and inspirational-ideological space for groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda to regroup and would immediately jeopardize functional, even if limited, improvements to Afghan governance and security (the two things that we will need if Afghanistan is ever able to function without U.S. support). We should not ignore the fact that we are no longer taking anywhere near the casualties of the past.
Where hundreds of Americans were killed each year in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2013, a tragic but lesser 23 have died this year. Thousands of Afghan security forces continue to give their lives for their country each year. The exigent question is thus this: is this sacrifice worth preventing a new Sept. 11-type attack on our soil?
Yes, absolutely.
