Decoding the security failings behind Shinzo Abe’s assassination

Still, video of Abe’s assassination indicates clear failings on the part of his protective detail. First off, watch the video below.

The first failure is the apparent lack of a cordon to separate the public from Abe. Cordons are sometimes impossible when a protectee is working a crowd, but any preplanned speech should have a cordon to deter and deny access to prospective threats.

The second failure is that the supervisor or officer in charge of Abe’s detail is simply too far away from him. This officer would have been responsible for immediately covering and, if practical, evacuating Abe as the attack began. Other officers should have also been close to Abe to enable them to “harden up” around him. Had they done so, the detail would likely have been able to shield Abe from the second apparent kill shot.

During the 2016 presidential campaign in the United States, we saw two examples of appropriate responses to a surprise attack. These incidents involved then-candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. As people rushed toward the stage, agents surrounded the protectees as others were left to tackle the protesters. This tactic is designed to obstruct the attacker’s line of sight to the protectee but also to mitigate the risk that the first visible threat is just a diversion to draw away security.

Third failing: Several of the Security Police detail clearly hesitate. One officer behind the orange flag to the left of the video can be seen pausing before rushing toward the attacker. Hesitation is something that the Secret Service, Diplomatic Security Service, which is responsible for protecting the secretary of state, U.S. ambassadors, and foreign dignitaries, and the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division-Protective Services Division, which is responsible for protecting the secretary of defense and top Defense Department leaders, train hard to mitigate. This involves training agents in “muscle memory” impulsive reactions to threats. The key is to trigger an impulse response in favor of training protocols rather than hesitation amid chaos and confusion.

Fourth failing: Two officers did react by putting themselves between Abe and the gunman between the first and second shots. But they were alone. These officers showed extraordinary courage by lunging into the line of fire while holding up a bulletproof shield disguised as a briefcase. Again, however, these two officers were left not only to try and prevent the second shot but also to rush to Abe’s aid after they realized Abe was down. It was at least seven seconds between the first shot and the time that the first officers reached Abe’s person. That’s too long.

In 1992, former President Ronald Reagan was confronted by a protester at an event in Las Vegas. Although Reagan’s Secret Service detail took four seconds to reach him, the agency regarded the incident as a significant security failure. It led to procedures being changed so that possible approaches to a protectee on stage are limited and some agents are close to a protectee at all times.

The Secret Service goes to some extreme lengths here. During former President George W. Bush’s World Series pitch in New York City just after the 9/11 attacks, for example, a Secret Service agent was disguised as an umpire on the field. In 2017, the head of Hillary Clinton’s Secret Service detail was disguised as a faculty member during an awarding of an honorary degree to Clinton in Wales in the United Kingdom. This allowed him to be the closest to Clinton on stage while making his presence nearly invisible.

The failings evident in Abe’s assassination evince the importance of consistent security procedures. Were a former U.S. president to have faced the same attack that Abe faced, he may well have survived. In Japan’s case, however, tragic split-second failings have now made history.