President Obama and the American people face momentous questions that must soon be answered regarding the war effort in Afghanistan. First, do we have a coherent strategy to achieve a clearly defined victory? Second, are we willing to commit to providing the realistic level of troop strength required to get there? Third, can we really assure the long-term viability of the central government in Kabul and its prospects for growing a legitimate national security force? Finally, is Obama committed to the effort for the long-term, despite the gathering anti-war movement among his fellow Democrats and from some on the Right? Recommendations from U.S. Commander Stanley McCrystal are in Obama’s hands now and the president is expected to make public his decisions later this month. If he is dedicated to winning what he calls “a war of necessity,” he must commit the necessary military resources to get the job done. The American people will not support a war of gradualism. Even if such resources are made available, it is likely that grave doubts will remain about the central Afghan government and its Army.
Meanwhile, there are extremely discouraging signs of a creeping Vietnamization hanging over the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. Propping up the Kabul regime now certainly recalls former President Nixon’s strategy of gradually turning the Vietnam war effort over to the South Vietnamese. Most military experts agree that Nixon’s strategy was working on the battlefield, but it was undone by Watergate and war weariness in Congress, the media and the general public.
But the analogy applies at an even deeper level in mimicking the flawed strategy of President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. They so micro-managed deployment and engagement of U.S. forces that for years Army and Marine commanders on the ground often had to get permission from Washington before returning fire when attacked by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular army units. Our air forces were similarly hobbled in missions over North Vietnam.
A clash earlier this week in which four American soldiers were killed near Ganjgal eerily recalls such disastrous micro-management. Under the Obama administration’s new Rules of Engagement (ROE) that are designed to minimize casualties among Afghan civilians, U.S. commanders denied repeated calls from troops on the ground for air and artillery strikes to break up intense Taliban attacks. As Examiner columnist Diana West notes elsewhere in today’s edition, a McClatchey reporter on the scene confirmed that no civilians were in the area to be struck. Did we not learn in Vietnam that wars cannot be won by forcing our soldiers to fight with one hand tied behind their backs?
