Congress must be extremely careful in trying to manage our military during wartime.
Our Founding Fathers wisely gave most of that management power to the president. Congress retains the power of the purse and the power of oversight. But history suggests wariness as to Congress’s abilities to use those powers well during wartime.
In December of 1776, at the low-point of the Revolution, during the “times that try men’s souls,” the Continental Congress voted to deny itself war-making powers and gave those powers to Gen. Washington. At the Constitutional Convention, there was little debate about giving the powers of commander-in-chief to the president.
The Founders followed the advice of Gen. Nathaniel Greene, who, as historian David Hackett Fischer quotes, had argued that “The Fate of War is so uncertain, dependent on so many Contingencies. A Day, nay an Hour is so important in the Crisis of publick Affairs that it would be folly to wait for Relief from the deliberative Councils of Legislative Bodies.” Although Congress retained oversight and the power of the budget, the Founders recognized that Congressional committees were not the optimal directors of military policy.
During the Civil War, Congress used those oversight powers for political posturing. The notorious Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War became a virtual star chamber for harassing Democrats while advancing Republican generals based on their political, not military, skills. For example, they provided a forum for Daniel Sickles to blame George Meade for Sickles’ own mistakes at Gettysburg.
The most constructive Congressional oversight of war policy came during World War II. Harry Truman headed Senate investigations of waste and fraud as the military prepared for war and saved the country billions of dollars while winning the confidence of the military leaders.
During the Korean War, mindful of how Truman’s committee led to the vice presidency, Lyndon Johnson, as detailed by biographer Robert Caro, eagerly headed the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee. But unlike the leadership exhibited by Truman, Johnson used his committee as a political stepping-stone for his own career, exaggerating unimportant and previously documented information as well as leaking unsubstantiated charges to garner favorable publicity.
After Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Senate narrowly avoided turning an investigation into MacArthur’s criticisms into an all-out assault on a president’s authority over military matters, almost provoking a constitutional crisis. It was only the skillful handling of that committee by Sen. Richard Russell of Georgia that turned that potentially explosive moment into a dignified exploration of the dangers of MacArthur’s proposals.
Partisanship played a major role in Congressional oversight hearings during the Vietnam War. Under the leadership of Sen. William Fulbright, Congress became a forum for criticisms of Johnson’s and Nixon’s efforts in the war. In his committee, America heard opposition to the war from supposed realists, such as [diplomat] George F. Kennan, as well as criticism of American militarism from historian Henry Steele Commager.
It was here that Congress aired accusations of American brutality from veterans such as John Kerry. In addition, Congress exercised its power of the purse and, despite America’s commitments in the Paris peace negotiations, denied money to help South Vietnam fight off the North’s invasion in 1975, leading to tens of thousands of civilian deaths.
Americans who voted for Democrats this November because of their dissatisfaction with the progress of the war in Iraq were expressing a wish that somehow, things should be going differently. We will now see to what extent the Democrats are willing to use Congress’s powers to manage the war. Democratic leaders, including Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and Rep. Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., are arguing to begin soon drawing down American forces.
If the military leaders resist demands for a drawdown, what will the Democrats in Congress do? Will they follow the Truman model by working in a bipartisan way to expose mistakes while protecting military prerogative? Or will they prefer the more political examples of the Joint Committee or Fulbright and use their committees as tools of partisan attack? And will they dare to behave as Congress did during the Vietnam War and cut funding for the Iraqi government if we do start withdrawing from Iraq?
Right now there seems to be little enthusiasm among Democrats for using their budgetary power to cut funding for the war. If the war continues with daily civilian murders and few signs that the Iraqi government is establishing control over the country, Democrats may ignore the advice of our generals and instead try to run military policy from Congress.
More than two centuries ago, our Founders resisted that approach and gave those powers to the president. It will be up to today’s Democrats to demonstrate that such power lies better in the hands of Congress. If history is any guide, though, there is a good chance that they’ll succeed only in exacerbating the partisan acrimony over the war in Iraq.
Betsy Newmark is a member of The Examiner Blog Board of Contributors and blogs at betsyspage.com.
