Over the past week, I have covered the controversy which erupted in the wake of comments by Hamdullah Mohib, Afghanistan’s national security adviser, criticizing Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy to Afghan peace talks, whom Mohib said Afghans increasingly perceived of as acting like a “viceroy.” Undersecretary of State David Hale responded with righteous indignation which, curiously, the State Department seldom applies to officials from Russia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Iran.
Khalilzad returned to Washington after the controversy, which he dismissed as “a slight chill in the air” and proceeded to meet with Tadamichi Yamamoto, the special representative of the secretary general for United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale; and Norway’s Deputy Foreign Secretary Audun Halvorsen. He subsequently met with the British and Pakistani ambassadors to discuss his ongoing deal-making with the Taliban.
But he has yet to brief Afghanistan’s elected president Ashraf Ghani on the commitments he has proposed to the Taliban. For Khalilzad to obligate Afghanistan to certain actions and commitments, to set aside clauses in its constitution, and perhaps to even further delay Afghanistan’s elections is to act as its viceroy. Frankly, Hale doth protest too much, methinks.
Khalilzad’s behavior is worse, however, because it plays into the Taliban’s hands.
Consider a parallel: For decades, North Korea offered peace talks to the United States but refused to accept any discussions at which South Korea was present. Pyongyang’s reasoning was simple: They saw themselves as the only legitimate government of the Korean peninsula. Both Democrats and Republicans understood, however, that by agreeing to such terms, the North Koreans would win before they even came to the table.
By cutting off the elected government of Afghanistan, and refusing even to brief their elected leaders on the substance of talks, Khalilzad is handing a victory to the Taliban (a group with which, pre-Sept. 11 attacks, he cooperated with for the sake of business). As Hale (a former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan who perhaps has internalized with too much generosity the legitimacy of the Pakistani narrative) doubles down on blacklisting Afghan officials, he and Khalilzad are signaling to regional states even before any firm Taliban commitments that they should accommodate the group even as it continues to slaughter innocents across Afghanistan.
If peace talks are going to succeed, it is essential to reinforce the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s elected government rather than throw it under the bus. It’s bad enough that Khalilzad acts like a viceroy and Hale appears to care more about Mohib’s rhetoric than the Taliban’s reality. It’s even worse, however, to ignore decades of diplomatic principle for the sake of a quick deal.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.
