Wilkerson Strikes Out

You will recall that Wilkerson recently came forward with a tale about how Vice President Cheney ordered enhanced interrogation techniques be used on a top al Qaeda operative in order to gin up phony intelligence connecting Iraq and al Qaeda. This, Wilkerson claimed, happened months before the techniques were approved by the Bush administration’s lawyers.

But it is obvious that the basic timeline of Wilkerson’s story does not work, drawing into question Wilkerson’s veracity. Wilkerson says that Cheney ordered the techniques used on an al Qaeda terrorist in “April and May 2002” and it didn’t stop until Ibn Shaykh al Libi, who Wilkerson says was waterboarded by a foreign intelligence service, revealed such links. The problem is that al Libi discussed links between Iraq and al Qaeda in February 2002–two months before Wilkerson claims that VP Cheney supposedly ordered the enhanced techniques used. Therefore, it could not have been al Libi’s admission that stopped the “torture” of another al Qaeda terrorist two months later.

Wilkerson’s story simply does not add up.

So, Wilkerson went on MSNBC last night in an attempt to salvage his tale. He didn’t. Instead, his appearance (in a highly favorable setting where a fawning Maddow did not challenge him at all) raises even more questions. For example, Wilkerson had this to say:

Wilkerson’s own “interlocutors”–whoever they are, assuming they even exist and actually have a scintilla of real knowledge about these affairs–say that VP Cheney did not issue the waterboarding order, Tenet did.

This is a big problem for Wilkerson. His whole story revolves around “Sith Lord” (Wilkerson’s words) Cheney’s alleged order. What is the basis for Wilkerson’s claim that Cheney ordered the putative waterboarding, and not Tenet? In a rambling summary of his own personal crusade against the Bush administration, Wilkerson claims he has strung together “multiple sources” for his stories–in general. But when it comes to VP Cheney’s specific role in Wilkerson’s tale, Wilkerson said this:

So, Wilkerson’s central allegation regarding VP Cheney is now admittedly based on his own “assumption,” but Wilkerson’s own “interlocutors” disagree.

Strike one.

And what of Ibn Shaykh al Libi–the al Qaeda operative who Wilkerson claims was waterboarded into confessing a phony link to the Iraqi regime? Wilkerson told Maddow that his story actually involves two al Qaeda operatives–al Libi and another unnamed al Qaeda terrorist who Wilkerson claims was also roughed up in order to find an Iraqi link. (Wilkerson’s original story was so poorly written it was difficult to tell if he was talking about one or two different al Qaeda operatives.)

Wilkerson did not name this second al Qaeda operative. But with respect to al Libi he said this, “I’m a little confused about al Libi, I admit that.” He added, “I still have to put that piece together.”

But al Libi was the only named al Qaeda terrorist in Wilkerson’s original account, and it was al Libi’s testimony that Wilkerson claimed stopped the enhanced interrogation of another. Now, Wilkerson says that he has to put al Libi’s story “together”–whatever that means (invent new details and sources?).

Wilkerson has, therefore, conceded that he does not actually know anything about al Libi.

Strike two.

The whole pretext for Wilkerson’s claims is false. Maddow asked Wilkerson about his contention that the enhanced interrogation techniques were used not to stop the next terrorist attack, but instead to extract phony intelligence in the lead-up to the Iraq war. Wilkerson explained, “By that time [April and May of 2002] we had done some things that, uh, had severely limited al Qaeda’s operational reach.” Wilkerson says that the U.S. had already “put al Qaeda very much on the defensive” and “those of us who were really in the business of looking at this knew that the possibility of another attack had receded somewhat.”

Who knew that as chief of staff to the Secretary of State, the nation’s chief diplomat, Wilkerson was a frontline player “in the business” of investigating the possibility of a post-9/11 terrorist attack? This is a bit of self-aggrandizement. More substantively, Wilkerson’s claim is plainly wrong, as those who were “really in the business” would surely explain to him.

It was not until March 2003, almost a year after Wilkerson’s story supposedly began, that the U.S. captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al Qaeda’s chief 9/11 planner. When KSM was captured he was clearly plotting more attacks against the continental U.S., as well as elsewhere. The U.S. did not even know that KSM was one of the main architects of 9/11 until March or April of 2002. I’m sure that al Qaeda’s operational reach was hampered by the invasion of Afghanistan and by a number of other measures. But the notion that al Qaeda was purely on the defensive with the likes of KSM still plotting additional attacks is specious. Indeed, the U.S. had few high-level al Qaeda operatives in custody in April and May of 2002. This is why the Bush administration and the CIA have claimed that the enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary–to find out what they did not know about al Qaeda’s operations.

Here is another example. Ramzi Binalshibh, al Qaeda’s chief point man for the 9/11 attacks, was not captured until September 2002, several months after Wilkerson’s story supposedly began. At the time, Binalshibh was also involved in plotting more attacks. Computers captured in Binalshibh’s safe house included the details of U.S. military vessels and other targets, and Binalshibh was plotting an attack against airliners at the Heathrow Airport in England as well. Al Qaeda continued with Binalshibh’s plot even after he was captured. In 2006, al Qaeda terrorists who were plotting to blow up several airliners destined for the U.S. were arrested in England. So, Binalshibh was still very much in terrorism business at the time Wilkerson claims the threat had sufficiently receded.

The KSM and Binalshibh examples are just two of many. Moreover, while al Qaeda has not executed any more attacks against the U.S. Homeland or foreign embassies, it has executed substantial international terrorist attacks elsewhere (e.g. the 7/7 bombings in London). Al Qaeda has also played a substantial role in the Iraqi and Afghani insurgencies, in addition to threatening the Pakistani government.

Wilkerson’s claim that the Bush administration was not using the interrogations of high-value terrorists to learn more about an organization that caught the U.S. government flat-footed and remained a serious threat to America is simply vacuous.

Strike three.

Wilkerson is out.

But, there is one more noteworthy point. Maddow and Wilkerson operate under the premise that there was no evidence linking the fallen Iraqi regime to al Qaeda. We can debate the extent of the relationship and what should have been done about it. But the claim that there was no evidence of a relationship at all and, therefore, it needed to be generated exclusively through torture is false.

The fact of the matter is that the U.S. Intelligence Community had collected evidence of a relationship for years. For example, former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet has written that there was “more than enough evidence” of a relationship. The relationship was even mentioned in the Clinton administration’s original indictment of al Qaeda in 1998. Foreign and American press outlets reported on the relationship years before the Bush administration made the case. Most importantly, the Iraqi regime’s own documents illustrate that it had a noteworthy relationship with al Qaeda and al Qaeda’s affiliates.

There are, quite simply, dozens upon dozens of pieces of evidence. And I’m sure that high-value detainees were asked about these pieces of evidence. It would have been negligent not to have done so.

However, Wilkerson and the left would prefer to pretend that none of that evidence exists. After all, if that body of evidence exists, then it didn’t need to be invented through torture. And then there is no reason for Mr. Wilkerson to invent tales about Vice President Cheney.

Thomas Joscelyn is senior editor of the website Long War Journal.