Post-Gulf War, Iraq failed to disclose its VX program to UN inspectors. Then, Iraqi officials denied they had successfully weaponized the nerve agent for military use. But UNSCOM’s October 1998 report on Iraq’s VX program declared:
The existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq’s declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any chemical warfare agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals known to be degradation products of decontamination compounds also do not support Iraq’s declarations that those warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols.
Chief UN inspector Hans Blix told to the Security Council in January 2003 that there were “indications that the [VX] agent was weaponised.” He stated:
Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared….There are also indications that the agent was weaponised.
And the September 2004 Duelfer report concluded:
Iraq had not adequately addressed VX production and weaponization activities-a point on which Iraq’s denials were contradicted by UNSCOM findings. ISG investigations into Iraq’s work with VX reveals that Iraq did weaponize VX in 1988, and dropped 3 aerial bombs filled with VX on Iran. The bombs, originally declared to be part of a storage stability trial, were in fact dropped on an undisclosed Iranian location in 1988.
In February 2003, Iraq made a proposal that it claimed would prove it had unilaterally destroyed its VX in 1991. But UNMOVIC’s May 30, 2003 report stated that Iraq’s proposal “would not address all of the unresolved issues” regarding VX.
UNMOVIC pointed out to Iraq that the primary concern with regard to VX was not simply the quantity unilaterally destroyed in 1991 but rather the retention of precursors, know-how and the extent of the development of the program in 1990. Therefore, Iraq’s sampling and quantification effort, even if successful, would not address all of the unresolved issues identified by UNMOVIC.
But why would the unaccounted for VX precursors matter? What’s the big deal? UNMOVIC’s March 6, 2003 report judged that:
Iraq’s VX programme included extensive efforts in a number of areas such as synthetic routes, stabilizers, and binary munitions. Given Iraq’s history of concealment with respect to its VX programme it cannot be excluded that it has retained some capability with regard to VX…. The major remaining issue relating to Iraq’s production capability is the fact that there are significant discrepancies in the accounting for all the key precursors… required to produce VX. A few other chemicals are required to produce VX… these are however readily available [to Iraq].
According to the September 2002 International Institute for Strategic Studies report,
Iraq could have retained stable precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin and a similar amount of VX. Weaponisation of any retained material would not pose a significant obstacle. Assessing the production of new CW agent and precursors depends on determining the degree to which Iraq will have chosen to mobilise its civilian chemical industry to produce these capabilities. Without inspectors present, Iraq would not find it difficult to build on pre 1991 stocks and produce and weaponise fresh agent…. Our net assessment of the current situation is that: Iraq has probably retained a few hundred tonnes of mustard and precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin/cyclosarin and perhaps similar amounts of VX from pre-1991 stocks. It is capable of resuming CW production on short notice (months) from existing civilian facilities. It could have produced hundreds of tonnes of agent (mustard and nerve agents) since 1998. In these circumstances, it is not possible accurately to estimate present stocks.
Evidently, Clinton Defense Secretary William Cohen was very worried about Saddam’s VX program.
One drop [of VX nerve agent] on your finger will produce death in a matter of just a few moments. Now the UN believes that Saddam may have produced as much as 200 tons of VX, and this would, of course, be theoretically enough to kill every man, woman and child on the face of the earth.
Cohen then recalled Iraq’s use of poison gas and the sarin attack in Tokyo. He warned that “we face a clear and present danger today,” and reminded people that the “terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center in New York had in mind the destruction and deaths of some 250,000 people that they were determined to kill.” A week before these comments Cohen said on ABC’s This Week that Saddam may have enough VX to kill “millions, millions, if it were properly dispersed and through aerosol mechanisms.”
