(But Still Pretty Bad) A little while back my colleague, Ulf Gartzke, wrote a piece on the perverse demographic effects of the European welfare state. The Economist follows with a piece that provides details on some of those effects, and some very interesting data. But while the piece is presented as a challenge to the arguments of folks like Mark Steyn (and Gartzke), the data actually seem to bolster their concerns:
Received opinion holds, in the phrase of Auguste Comte, a 19th-century social scientist, that “demography is destiny” and that Europe is doomed by its death-spiral population numbers. American observers from Walter Laqueur, an academic, to Mark Steyn, a conservative polemicist, argue that Europe is fast becoming a barren, ageing, enfeebled place. Vast numbers of old people, they reckon, will be looked after, or neglected, by too few economically active adults, supplemented by restless crowds of migrants. The combination of low fertility, longer life and mass immigration will put intolerable pressure on public health, pensions and social services, leading (probably) to upheaval. There are several possible objections to that gloomy forecast. One is that a growing population is not, of itself, necessarily a good thing, nor a falling one unambiguously bad. Another is that there is no short-term correlation between population change and wealth: Japan and South Korea have even lower fertility than Europe. But there is a simpler objection: the picture of relentless decline is wrong, or, to be accurate, half wrong. Europe is not in decline. Rather, as Jitka Rychtarikova of the Charles University in Prague argues, it no longer makes sense to talk about Europe as a single demographic unit at all. There are two Europes. One is the familiar place of low fertility and population decline. Here, the fertility rate is below 1.5 and countries are struggling in a fertility trap. The low fertility belt runs from the Mediterranean to central and eastern Europe, embracing both old and new parts of the continent. The other, surprising Europe is a place of recovering fertility and rising population. It stretches from Scandinavia to France. Here, countries have escaped the fertility trap and the childbearing rate is around 1.8-not high, but higher than it was, and, in some cases, reaching the magic replacement level.
Specifically, the Economist identifies three places where the fertility rate is above the replacement level: France, Denmark, and Ireland. Loyalties to my ancestral home notwithstanding, France is the only country among those three with a population large enough to qualify it as important in determining ‘where Europe is headed.’ And for those who may see reason to be alarmed at the growing Muslim population in Europe, it’s noted that while none track birth by religious affiliation, the fertility rate for French immigrants is 2.5 children per woman; for those born in France it is 1.65. Given the high percentage of Muslims among the immigrant population as compared to the incumbent group, it seems likely that Muslims “recovering fertility.” But at least France is growing–as are England and Sweden. In Germany, the bottom appears to be dropping out. The average woman has only 1.4 children–far below replacement level–and polls show that young people no longer want as many as 2 children. The Economist notes that because so many countries have birth rates only slightly below replacement level, the region’s entire population will fall by just 7 million in the next 43 years. As a share of the world’s population, that means a fall from 21% to 7%. The Economist ultimately concludes that things might not be bad as they seem for Europe. After all, France and Britain will still have more than 2 workers per retiree in 2050. By comparison, the United States now has 3.3 workers per retiree; at 2 workers per retiree, the system is seen as reaching a crisis. So the good news isn’t much to get excited about. The conclusion:
None of this means that Europe has broken the chains of its demography. The EU’s overall population will fall by 7m by 2050. The so-called support ratio (roughly, the proportion of workers to pensioners) is declining everywhere. And as Mr Coleman points out, Europe’s share of global population will fall from 21% now to 7% by 2050. Even its successes are only relative. A fertility rate of 1.8 is still below replacement. All the same, small shifts in fertility or the retirement age can go a long way to alleviating the burdens of population decline. Raising the retirement age by a year or two can make the difference between the solvency and insolvency of pensions. On current rates, Italy will have a mere 1.4 workers to support each retired person by 2050. France and Britain will have a much more favourable age pyramid, with more than two workers per pensioner.
Yes, it’s safe to say that despite the uptick in some nations–which might reflect increased births by traditional Europeans, but probably doesn’t–Europe is not yet out of the woods.
