While researching for his newly published book, “Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons,” Joseph Cirincione unearthed surprises along the way.
“The scientists who first made the bomb were also the first to try to control it,” the D.C.-based author said. “If we had followed their advice then, we might not have so many nuclear dangers now.”
Since the 1930s, atomic power has evolved into a multifaceted universal force: energy source, security blanket, security threat, the ultimate tool of terror. It’s no irrational fear: Cirincione writes, “There is enough fissile material in the world for 300,000 bombs,” each one capable of annihilating cities and poisoning the atmosphere. Russia and the U.S. still maintain thousands of warheads on hair-trigger alert.
Cirincione cracks a vault of insight about nuclear proliferation and offers well-reasoned strategies for persuading nations to decrease arsenals, secure storehouses and keep bombs out of terrorists’ hands.
The author’s credentials include national security chief for the Center for American Progress and director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
He illuminates the intentions and failures of past coercive and cooperative disarmament efforts, counteroffering “a comprehensive strategy thatcombines the best elements of the U.S.-centric, force-based approach with the traditional multilateral, treaty-based approach.”
It’s time to recognize that other nations have concerns as important as our own, yielding commonsense proposals like this: Ensure a country steady supply of nuclear power for civilian use in exchange for agreeing not to produce fuels that could be commandeered for weapons.
The compact book zips from a bomb-building primer to the Manhattan Project, the reasoning behind the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Soviet rejection of a United Nations-administered international nuclear disarmament plan. Cirincione explains, “Stalin saw the bomb as more than a weapon. It was also a symbol of industrial might, national might, scientific accomplishment and national prestige” — an example of “multicausality” that motivates nations to pursue nuclear goals.
Unheeded expert warnings get a new audience: “Einstein wrote in March 1950, ‘The idea of achieving security through national armaments is … a disastrous illusion.” Other lessons derive from the idealistic Atoms for Peace program, the “duck and cover” era, bomb-testing fervor, South Africa’s joint dismantling of apartheid and its secret nuclear program, the resourceful “Megatons to Megawatts” campaign and the hazardous economic fallout of arms race participation.
The book analyzes the impact of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which sought to bar the nuclear “haves” from transferring arms to “have-nots,” and deter development of nuclear weapons. As technology spreads, Cirincione stresses the need to “prevent nuclear fuel rods from becoming nuclear bombs,” noting lessons learned from such efforts as “Megatons to Megawatts.”
The author tackles a quartet of nuclear threats: terrorism, securing existing arsenals, potential regional arms races launched by wary neighbors of such players as Iran and North Korea, and the possible collapse of global nonproliferation efforts.
“I’m an optimist,” Cirincione maintains while preparing for a book talk at the Center for American Progress. “We have the programs in place to effectively eliminate nuclear terrorism; we just lack the political leadership to do it.”
Pass this riveting read around, and that may change.
– Robin Tierney
