On Monday, General Kenneth McKenzie of the U.S. Marine Corps appeared to morph into a Biden administration politician.
This is to be regretted. The commanding officer of U.S. Central Command, McKenzie has served America in uniform for 42 years. He is an infantry officer with multiple combat deployments. He deserves unequivocal gratitude for this service.
Still, as he announced the final U.S. evacuation flights had left Afghanistan, McKenzie made some obviously political remarks. For a start, he happily endorsed the Biden administration’s contention it somehow retains diplomatic leverage to pressure a Taliban regime that, as its raison d’être, despises compromise with America.
“The military phase of this operation has ended.” McKenzie said, “The diplomatic sequel to that will now begin, and I believe our Department of State is going to work very hard to allow any American citizens that are left — and we think the citizens that were not brought out number in the low, very low hundreds. I believe that we’re going to be able to get those people out. I think that we’re also going to negotiate very hard, very aggressively to get our other Afghan partners out … The weapons have just shifted, if you will, from the military realm to the diplomatic realm.”
That isn’t a military assessment. It’s a political statement the White House will be proud of. Note McKenzie’s deliberate underplaying of the “very low hundreds” of Americans who have been left behind. Note his presentation of the State Department as a seamless leveraging force in the absence of the U.S. military. As Michael Rubin notes, the only leverage the Biden administration possesses is that of possible ransom payments.
McKenzie also jumped to the defense of Biden’s decision to abandon some Americans and Afghan allies by holding to an Aug. 31 withdrawal deadline.
“If we’d stayed another 10 days, Luiz, we wouldn’t have gotten everybody out that we wanted to get out. And there still would have been people who would have been disappointed with that. It’s a tough situation. But I want to emphasize again that simply because we have left … [those Afghans and Americans left behind] will not be denied that opportunity [to leave]. I think that our Department of State is going to work that very hard in the days and weeks ahead.”
Note that McKenzie does not accept that 10 more days might have enabled more rescues but only that it would not have allowed a total evacuation. This is a false comparison. The general’s implication is that those who are “disappointed” we have abandoned our fellow citizens are perhaps partisan.
McKenzie also supported the Biden administration’s more ludicrous belief that being polite to the Taliban will earn its respect rather than its disdain. He said that “they helped us secure the airfield, not perfectly, but they gave it a very good effort, and it was actually significantly, significantly helpful to us, particularly here at the end.”
Elements of the British military deployed at the airport believed — and acted in the belief — that McKenzie and his commanders were too deferential to the Taliban. Regardless, the Taliban obviously weren’t that helpful, though, were they? ISIS personnel were able to get close enough to the airport, presumably through Taliban checkpoints, to launch rocket attacks. I have also spoken to sources in the United States and British security establishments who believe that last Thursday’s devastating ISIS bomb attack on the airport, which took 13 American lives, would have required some measure of Taliban acquiescence.
Finally, McKenzie said the U.S. would “always retain the ability to [effectively target terrorists in Afghanistan].” This confidence is wildly optimistic.
I’m sorry, but it’s a stretch to suggest McKenzie stuck to his military brief on Monday. This, perhaps, is just another example of a much broader problem in the U.S. general officer ranks.
