Europe breathed a small sigh of relief on Thursday when Russian energy giant Gazprom resumed natural gas shipments through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline. There was significant concern in European capitals that President Vladimir Putin, in an attempt to exacerbate gas shortages in Europe in retaliation for its support of Ukraine, would keep the pipes closed following repairs.
But while the European Union may have dodged an energy bullet for now, the threat of a Russian energy cutoff remains real. The EU, which imported nearly 45% of its natural gas from Russia last year, recognizes just how much it depends on Putin. Europe has spent the year trying to diversify suppliers; Italy signed a $4 billion deal with Algeria last week to increase gas imports from the North African nation, while France signed an energy cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates. The EU is set to double imports of natural gas from Azerbaijan by 2027, all to evade potential blackmail by Russia.
Yet finding alternative suppliers is only part of the battle. The EU also needs to take measures on the supply side, which means encouraging members to use less gas in the summer months in order to maintain higher reserves during the winter. The European Commission has just released a plan to do precisely that, recommending a 15% reduction in natural gas use across the continent by next spring and making the target mandatory during an emergency.
Still, some EU member states aren’t pleased with the European Commission’s proposal. Greece takes issue with the notion that every state should be held to the same standard, particularly when Athens has done its due diligence and prepared itself for possible shortages. Portugal is complaining about the lack of consultation before the proposal was presented. Spain, which has sufficient infrastructure to boost non-Russia LNG imports, doesn’t appreciate being asked to sacrifice for the sake of countries like Germany, which until this year was largely content with wrapping itself in the arms of the Russian bear. Hungary, meanwhile, is essentially ignoring what the country views as a diktat from Brussels bureaucrats — the Orban administration is not only looking for more Russian gas but preventing any of its supplies from being used to bail out neighbors dealing with a shortage in supply.
The commission’s plan will be voted on next week. But if reports on the whip count are any guide, there is a high probability Brussels will have to come back to the drawing board and pitch another idea. Much as the Eurozone crisis during the last decade divided the continent between north and south, the EU’s gas conservation strategy is resurrecting similar fault lines. It appears Putin doesn’t actually need to cut natural gas exports to cause friction in Europe — European politicians are doing it themselves.
One key question is how these emerging views might affect Europe’s military and financial support for Kyiv?
The EU has shown an impressive degree of unity on the war thus far. Russia’s disgusting conduct during the war and tendency to hit civilian structures with missiles has made forging this type of consensus much easier.
But as the conflict drags on through the fall, the risk of “Ukraine fatigue” in European capitals is bound to set in. In some sense, it already has. Although this is inexcusable in the minds of the moralists, it’s also an inevitable byproduct of a tight oil supply, a rise in food prices, and high inflation — all of which have been exacerbated by the war. Putin has the luxury of operating in an authoritarian system of his own making. European governments, though, are accountable to their people.
The EU likes to talk about solidarity. But as the disputes over energy attest, conflicting national interests can be a powerful force.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
