President Trump has the unilateral authority to order the use of nuclear weapons.
But warning that a “mistake by Trump could kill hundreds of thousands on the Korean peninsula,” Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., is introducing legislation to restrict Trump’s ability to launch a nuclear first strike.
Murphy won’t succeed. That’s because absent a constitutional amendment, Trump’s nuclear weapons authority cannot be constrained by legislation.
While there are legitimate debates over a president’s constitutional aut
Moreover, we can be confident that a U.S. president would never use nuclear weapons absent a time-sensitive, exigent national danger. After all, there are safeguards against a mentally unstable president using nuclear weapons without justification.
First off, the secretary of defense and/or the chairman of the Joint Chiefs must affirm any presidential order to use nuclear weapons. And while these two officials could not overrule the president, they could obstruct him by refusing to give their affirmation. Witnessing a president’s intentions, they could contact the Cabinet to report his looming national catastrophe. The Cabinet could then apply Section 4 of the 25th Amendment and declare the president unable to carry out his duties. Facing the existential national stakes of a nuclear weapons employment, the Cabinet would not hesitate to act.
The central problem with Murphy’s legislation is that it would introduce lethargy into a nuclear command authority that requires speed.
Imagine, for example, if the U.S. learned an enemy actor was preparing a nuclear weapons strike against the U.S. from an unspecified launching area. At present, the U.S. could launch a pre-emptive nuclear saturation strike that would destroy the launch area and remove the threat. Murphy’s bill would prevent that course of action and in so doing risk the life of the nation.
Still, there’s an alternative way to guard against the low-risk that the Cabinet and military leaders one day forgot their oaths and accepted a president’s nuclear irrationality.
Again, it’s Section 4 of the 25th Amendment!
Section 4 explains that the president can be suspended from office “Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit [to congressional leaders that the president is incapable of carrying out his duties].”
The operative point here is “or of such other body as Congress may by law provide.” In turn, why doesn’t Congress legislate to provide that a president can be declared incapable by a 3 out of 4 votes by the chief of staff, director of the White House Medical Unit, the national security adviser, and the White House counsel? Each of these officials serves under the official White House Office, so would appear to qualify under Section 4’s “other body” requirement.
Ultimately, this reform would add another level of safeguard against irrational use of nuclear weapons, but without weakening the nation’s national security.
