The second-in-command of a Navy submarine was fired this week, making him the third senior leader of a ship to be dismissed in two days.
Lt. Cmdr. Jonathan Cebik was removed Monday from his position as executive officer of the USS Jimmy Carter over concerns regarding his personal judgment. Two other senior officers were removed for the same reason Tuesday.
Such dismissals are by no means unusual, current and former Navy officers told the Washington Examiner. A 2004 Navy inspector general report found that 78 officers were removed for similar reasons between January 1999 and June 2004, an average of slightly more than one per month.
“If someone were to take and graph these reliefs over time, you would find that they are fairly regular,” Bryan McGrath, a Navy contractor and former Navy officer, told the Washington Examiner. “They happen every year, and they tend to happen in little cluster groups. I can’t explain that. I don’t think anyone can.”
McGrath said he served with one of the relieved commanders but declined to specify which.
The spate of firings comes as the Navy continues to implement reforms following two high-profile collisions involving the USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald in 2017. Investigations into the accidents found that inadequate leadership and subpar training contributed, sparking a major internal review and 117 changes across the fleet. The reform process has also reinvigorated a debate between senior leaders and a younger generation of officers over the Navy’s zero-tolerance culture regarding mistakes.
“In the U.S. Navy, there is a widespread perception that no mistakes or failings will be tolerated. Such zero-error tolerance is one of the main reasons for the relief from command of U.S. naval officers in the past two decades,” Milan Vego, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote in an article for the U.S. Naval Institute last year.
While the exact reasons behind the recent firings remain unclear, some officers are concerned commanding officers are not given a chance to learn from their mistakes.
“We are breeding a generation of COs who will be afraid to take risks,” Lt. Cmdr. James Drennan told the Washington Examiner.
The captains of the McCain and Fitzgerald, as well as some of their senior officers, were fired as a result of their ships’ collisions. Such removals are considered career-ending, but that has not always been the case. Adm. Chester Nimitz, a World War II admiral for whom an aircraft carrier is named, ran a destroyer aground and was reprimanded by his commander before becoming a hero in the Pacific theater. Adm. Mike Mullen received 115 demerits at the Naval Academy, graduated near the bottom of his class, and struck a buoy while commanding a gasoline tanker before becoming the chief of naval operations in 2005 and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2007.
“Some people … they refer to it as a zero-tolerance or zero-defect mentality,” McGrath, a former destroyer captain, said. “That’s crap. It’s not a zero-defect mentality. It is a zero acceptance of deviating from the standard that is expected of you.”
McGrath and other officers said there is a unique level of responsibility that goes with command in the Navy. Ship commanders out to sea have ultimate authority over their ships and are expected to make crucial decisions in situations where the closest friendly vessel may be hundreds of miles away. It’s this “detached” nature of command that requires adherence to standards, McGrath said.
Why the three officers fired this week were removed from command remains unclear. Official statements from the Navy say they were removed due to “loss of confidence,” a generic term that can include misdeeds from harassment to negligence.
The Navy is investigating Cebik’s personal conduct in relation to his removal. As executive officer of the Carter, he was responsible to the captain for all aspects of the submarine’s operations and confirming its readiness for combat. Fast-attack nuclear submarines are a crucial, and secretive, component of the Navy’s capabilities, making an executive officer’s responsibilities even more significant.
Two senior officers in Japan, Capt. Tadd Gorman and Lt. Cmdr. Randall Clemons, were dismissed Tuesday.
Gorman was removed as skipper of the missile cruiser USS Antietam after less than three months on the job. Like Cebik, he was removed due to a loss of confidence in his “personal judgment and ability to command” following an investigation by his superiors. Cruisers like the Antietam serve as the backbone of the Navy’s surface fleet and are capable of launching missiles against ships, aircraft, and land-based targets.
Clemons was relieved as the executive officer of the USS McCampbell, a missile destroyer, “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to fulfill his responsibilities.” He had served as the ship’s second-in-command since February and was fired following an evaluation by his leadership. He served as second-in-command of the Fitzgerald from August to December 2017, joining the crew shortly after the ship collided with a commercial ship off the Japanese coast in June 2017.
Two senior Navy leaders not in command of a ship have also been removed this month. Rear Adm. Stephen Williamson was fired from his post as director of industrial operations at Naval Sea Systems Command after an inspector general investigation discovered he was in a “consensual, but inappropriate personal relationship.” Sea Systems Command is responsible for ensuring ships are delivered to the Navy on time and at cost.
Capt. Theron Toole, the commander of the Navy Medicine Operational Training Center, was removed from his position overseeing the training of 18,000 personnel annually after his superior expressed a “loss of confidence” in his command.
“[I]t’s not necessarily a sign of a larger trend,” Drennan said. “At a certain point, though, after enough officers are relieved, you begin to wonder whether we are properly promoting and adequately screening officers for command. I don’t think we’re there right now, but we’ve been there in the past.”
