BAGHDAD — Iraqis went to the polls on May 12, and the results are now in. The Bayan Center’s Sajad Jiyad, one of the most important Twitter accounts to follow for lucid Iraq analysis, has the breakdown and analysis. In short, it’s a free for all. And that’s good: How many Arab countries have repeatedly now had democratic and peaceful transfers of power? And in how many countries do those ousted compete to return to power through the ballot box rather than force of arms?
As for the results: No party came near a majority, but Iraqi firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s list came out on top, and incumbent Haider al-Abadi and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki were disappointed in their results. Some of those who did not make the cut complained of cheating or voting machine irregularities, and cheating certainly marred voting in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Barzani and Talabani families refuse to relax their death grip on power or the region’s treasury, democratic will be damned. But the reason why Sadr did proportionately well relative to other power blocks is that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, tired of corruption among the political class, told people that voting was their right to engage in or ignore, just as Iraqis have free will to drink or choose not to drink a glass of water placed in front of them. Many Abadi and Maliki supporters stayed home, but Sadr’s base remained energized.
Now comes the jockeying to form a coalition. Sadr may have won the majority, but can the established political class form a coalition to keep him out? Or will Abadi’s rivals, loath to see him have another term, work with Sadr to deny it? Can Maliki be kingmaker? Will the Kurds seek the presidency, or the speakership of parliament, which actually is a more powerful position? Are there any compromise candidates? (Here, keep an eye on Ali Dawai Lazem, a Sadrist who, as governor of Maysan, distinguished himself for effectiveness, honesty, and results).
Against the backdrop of the political maneuvering, however, are questions about Washington and Tehran. Whether Iraqis, Iranians, and Americans like it or not, traditionally both Tehran and Washington have an unofficial veto over the premiership in Baghdad. That makes sense: Whoever is Iraq’s prime minister has to work with both Iran and the United States. There is no time more crucial than now to negotiate and, if necessary, wield that veto.
It’s unrealistic to deny that Iran will have some influence in Iraq. Iraqis live in a difficult neighborhood. They share a more than 900-mile border. And, like it or not, Iranian authorities have been willing to exert force to ensure their redlines are respected. While commentators in the West often characterize the Popular Mobilization Units (Hashd al-Shaabi) as Iranian-controlled Shi’ite militias, the reality is that they are not uniformly Shi’ite and perhaps 70 percent are under the command or control of the Iraqi government. True, that means 30 percent are not, and that’s a huge problem, one not solved by walking away from Iraq and handing the country to Iranian influence on a silver platter. Already, Qassem Soleimani, who as commander of the Quds Force also acts as Iran’s de facto foreign minister on the most important files for the Iranian leadership, has been in Najaf and Baghdad to push Iraqi politicians to a coalition outcome favorable to Tehran.
But what about the United States?
Iraq traditionally maintains its independence of action by using the U.S. presence and interest to counter Iranian demands (this is why Barack Obama’s 2011 withdrawal was so counterproductive). Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and an experienced diplomat with almost 15 years on the Iraq account, is in Iraq doing, without moral equivalence, much the same diplomatic jockeying as Soleimani. Whether he is doing so effectively, however, is an open question here in Baghdad.
Firstly, Iraqis from across the political, sectarian, and ethnic spectrum question whether McGurk’s advocacy so far for Abadi is actually backfiring against the prime minister. Make no mistake, Abadi is the right choice in many ways: He is a technocrat, capable, a coalition-builder, and has a mind toward economic development and a more stable future. The bigger question surrounding McGurk’s actions in Baghdad is who, if anybody, McGurk represents. This is not McGurk’s fault. Previously, Obama made clear that McGurk spoke on his behalf, and that he had the support of Secretary of State John Kerry. Now, however, it’s not clear if McGurk has the support of President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Iraqis are avid consumers of American political gossip, and they are aware of debates about scrapping McGurk’s position. This lack of clarity about what confidence Trump and Pompeo have in McGurk undercuts McGurk’s ability to be effective.
Again, don’t blame McGurk. Rather, it behooves Trump or Pompeo at this crucial time to stand up and either say, “Mr. McGurk is our man and he carries the word of the White House” or, conversely, to appoint someone who does. Regardless, the current confusion undercuts Washington’s ability to influence at a crucial time.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.
