It took six weeks of back-and-forth statements to get to this point, but U.S. and Iranian diplomats have finally met in person with a view to resuscitating the Iran nuclear deal. In a sign of how little trust there is between the parties, the U.S. and Iranian delegations are relying on the Europeans to shuttle position papers back and forth. The aim is to find a mechanism that matches U.S. sanctions relief to Iranian nuclear concessions.
The Biden administration’s position on this entire affair has been clear: If the Iranians come back into compliance with their nuclear commitments, the U.S. would do the same by lifting sanctions enacted by the Trump administration. While Iranian officials are largely fine with the concept of a compliance-for-compliance agreement, they have been adamant that Washington take the first step. The White House, concerned about upsetting the hawkish crowd at home, continues to press for a different road map, whereby Washington and Tehran take steps simultaneously. The State Department doesn’t expect a diplomatic breakthrough to occur this week.
All of this pain was avoidable.
We wouldn’t have to undergo these tedious negotiations if the previous administration was willing to leave good enough alone. Like the child who spilled milk all over the floor, America is now on its hands and knees trying to clean up a mess of its own making. This is less a defense of an imperfect nuclear deal than it is an indictment of the Trump maximum pressure strategy that replaced it.
Despite the occasional comments from former President Donald Trump about negotiating with Iran, his policy relied exclusively on the big stick. There was an ingrained assumption in the Trump administration that the Iranians could be pushed around into submission. All the mullahs needed was to feel a tight squeeze economically. The logic behind maximum pressure was elementary, which is perhaps what made it so appealing: Crunch Tehran’s wallet underneath your feet long enough, and Iran would have no option but to beg for relief. The U.S. would then be able to name its price.
The problem, of course, is that relatively weak but proud countries aren’t often willing to subject themselves to humiliation, particularly when the party doing the humiliating is an avowed adversary.
There is no question maximum pressure constrained Iran’s export revenue and threw a wrench into its finances. Between 2018 and 2019, Tehran lost nearly 13% of its GDP, saw tens of billions of dollars of its own money locked in overseas accounts, and watched its oil exports plunge by 75%. But none of this economic pressure resulted in a significant break in Iran’s foreign policy, which, of course, was the main U.S. policy objective. Rather than capitulate, Iranian scientists began enriching more uranium at higher purity. Advanced centrifuges were installed in Iran’s Natanz facility and its underground site at Fordow. Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium grew exponentially. Tehran’s ballistic missile program continued, as did its support for proxies in the Middle East. Iran became more aggressive in the region, not less. U.S. troops stationed in Iraq experienced more rocket attacks from Shia militias, some of which resulted in fatalities. In the early days of 2020, the U.S. and Iran were inches away from a full-blown conflict that nobody wanted.
Fortunately, by the virtue of good luck and restraint, a costly and totally unnecessary war was averted. Cooler heads prevailed. But the maximum pressure strategy was in many ways responsible for bringing us there. The negotiations in Vienna are about resurrecting a highly controversial nonproliferation accord. But they are also about preventing America from being dragged into another foolish Middle East war.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
