What should courts do about the mistakes they make?

To understand how this case addresses that tension, we must first examine the sentencing process for those convicted of federal crimes. Federal district courts possess some discretion in doling out punishment. But this discretion must operate within a congressionally mandated framework. That framework includes what are called the “Sentencing Guidelines.” These guidelines place convicted persons within different “offense levels” based on a combination of factors, including the crime committed and past criminal history, among others. Each offense level establishes a range of punishment, often jail time, within which a district court is advised to keep the convicted person’s sentence.

In this case, a district court counted one prior conviction for the defendant, Florencio Rosales-Morales, two times. Doing so inserted Florencio into a higher offense level, thus assigning him a longer recommendation window for his prison sentence.

No one denied that the district court messed up. The debate concerned what appellate courts should do about it. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for a 7-2 majority remanding the case to a lower court to correct the error.

Sotomayor defended this outcome as upholding justice. In so doing, she articulated principles of fairness affirmed by the decision.

First, justice demanded the court’s correction when they affected “substantial rights.” Sotomayor argued that the district court’s error affected one of the most substantial rights that Rosales-Morales possessed: his liberty. Jail time deprives a person of his or her freedom. If administered, according to law, such deprivation violates no substantial right. But any imprisonment beyond that accorded by statute constitutes an “unnecessary deprivation of liberty” and thus a significant violation. Sotomayor pointed out that the sentencing structure, if correctly followed, would yield a lesser sentence for Rosales-Morales. Thus, she reasoned, the additional months in jail violated the man’s liberty.

Second, justice demanded that judges apply laws in a “neutral” and “consistent” manner. Rosales-Morales deserved the same treatment as others in similar circumstances. The “Sentencing Guidelines” did not create the scope of incarceration time for Rosales-Morales’ criminal history under which he was sentenced. That meant that others with the same history would be sentenced under a lower range. Again, this circumstance created injustice.

Third, justice demanded proportionality. Why do we have different sentences for different crimes? Sotomayor quoted federal law to answer that punishment should be “‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ … to achieve the overarching sentencing purposes.” Those purposes included “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” With a variety of crimes, perpetrators, and purposes to sentencing, punishment must involve some level of calibration. While far from an exact science, the “Sentencing Guidelines” seek to apply the appropriate punishment that fit the crime. To sentence someone outside those standards violates the law’s own understanding of proportionality. On this point as well, Sotomayor pointed to the miscarriage of justice that occurred in this case.

Finally, in upholding justice, Sotomayor argued that correcting errors such as this one guarded judicial legitimacy. The “public reputation” of the judicial system hangs on its perceived adherence to the principles of justice already discussed. An unjust court is considered an illegitimate one. A perceived illegitimate one is a weak court. Thus, Sotomayor implied, the Supreme Court had both self-interested and altruistic reasons to decide as it did.

At the same time, Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissenting opinion gave an important caution. He argued that the Supreme Court must protect against so-called “sandbagging.” That practice consists of lawyers intentionally neglecting to object to court errors, then bringing them up on appeal in hopes of getting a better outcome for their client. Rosales-Morales’ legal counsel did not object to the sentencing error at the district level. Would allowing them to do so here open the floodgates to lawyers gaming the system?

This fear brought with it a legitimate claim to necessity. The courts have only so many judges with only so much time. A bogged-down system means the judiciary takes longer to hear and to decide cases. In this way, necessity involved some claim to justice. If justice delayed is justice denied, the threat Thomas pointed to could mean that rights were undermined in some fashion.

Both Sotomayor and Thomas point to legitimate principles. The judiciary exists to enforce justice under law. Significant errors by judges undermine that goal. The judiciary also must get its job done and protect its processes against subterfuge. But, in the end, the former principle must take precedence over the latter. Judges protect judicial processes for the sake of realizing justice, not the other way around. Laws and their application exist to protect rights first and foremost, not to guard the courts from the wiles of scheming lawyers.

Our Constitution’s preamble states our government’s goal as to “establish Justice … and secure the Blessings of Liberty.” Here, the majority did just that.

Adam Carrington is assistant professor of politics at Hillsdale College.