Lindsey Graham fell for an August prank call by two Russian comedians, Alexey Stolyarov and Vladimir Kuznetsov. Nicknamed Lexus and Vovan, the duo have also pranked Adam Schiff. But I can share a little more insight on the two. After all, they also pranked me.
Their May 2018 prank against me followed an article I wrote that rather upset the Russian government. That article also gave the Kremlin a propaganda opportunity to retaliate against me for my broader coverage of their activities. Regardless, there are two key takeaways for you to know when it comes to Lexus and Vovan.
First, they are good at prank calls. Second, and more importantly, they are not just comedians. They are Russian intelligence contract agents.
Lexus and Vovan are tasked by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s officers about who to prank, and then guided in pranking them. But this doesn’t simply involve a casual phone call and a simple, “Hey, you should call X and say Y.” It involves Russian intelligence service informational briefings on the prank targets, intelligence service support in setting up fake email accounts and phone numbers to trick targets, and guidance on how to navigate past target gatekeepers.
Admittedly, I wasn’t such a big challenge. I received a message from an email address mimicking a Ukrainian government account. It thanked me for my defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and said that the then-Ukrainian foreign minister wanted to thank me via phone call. I gave them my desk number. They called me directly. I should have had more sense and contacted them through Ukrainian government channels. That’s on me.
But when you’re calling Graham or Boris Johnson (another Lexus-Vovan victim), you need a lot of special knowledge to find the right phone number or email, and then to get past the operator board and the specific secretary. That Lexus and Vovan find such sustained success with their calls indicates the priority that Putin’s intelligence services place on this lighter operational activity. A non-insignificant amount of intelligence operational work goes into such pranks.
That speaks to the unique nature of Putin’s intelligence activity. Only he, a former KGB Lieutenant Colonel, could value intelligence operations split between sending assassination teams armed with high-toxicity nerve agents into western cities on the one hand, and conducting prank calls on the other.
But as silly as that sounds, both actions serve a common purpose of isolating and silencing (by killing or discrediting) problematic voices. That informs the Russian intelligence service’s predilection for cultivating disinformation, doubt, and ultimately fear in enemy minds, and for silencing voices where it’s seen as a necessary in and of itself, and/or to provoke a broader fear. But sometimes the two sides combine in form.
During my prank call, Lexus and Vovan told me they would send me a gift from their embassy. They edited out that part out of the call when they made it public. But the implication was clear: be careful if you cross the Russian government.
