Sixteen more years: decoding new Russian legislation to sustain Putin’s rule

On Tuesday, two parliamentarians from Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party tabled legislation to enable the president to remain in office until 2036. Their action joins another bill preventing Putin from facing prosecution after leaving office.

Taken together, it’s clear that this effort is specifically designed to support Putin’s personal interests. Clarifying legislation for recent constitutional amendments, the Duma bill states that:

The provision of the Constitution of the Russian Federation limiting the number of terms during which the same person can hold the office of the President of the Russian Federation, applies to a person who held and (or) is currently the President of the Russian Federation, excluding the number of terms during which it occupied and (or) holds this position at the time of the entry into force of the amendment to The Constitution of the Russian Federation, introducing the corresponding restriction, and does not exclude the possibility for him to hold a position of the President of the Russian Federation within the periods allowed by the specified position.

This basically translates as: No one else will get to do this, but Putin is allowed to run for another term in office in 2024, then again in 2030.

The Russian leader might have centered immense power around his own person, but he knows that any perception of his weakness will unleash patiently waiting rivals and birth new, perhaps even more dangerous, enemies. Hence the legislation.

Putin’s fusion oligarchical-security state regime has offered both great inducements for loyalty to the leader but also paranoia and envy. Corruption is rife across the mid-to-higher ranks of the security services. And lucrative business activity across Russia is defined by pay-to-play schemes and graft. Indeed, the FSB security service acts not as a checking force on this activity, but rather as a supervisor — ensuring that all corruption is in conformity with Putin’s interests. Hence why the FSB, in August, attempted to assassinate the investigative journalist, Alexei Navalny. The journalist has simply been too good at unveiling the Kremlin’s rot.

Still, just as Putin’s enemies know that Navalny’s persecution is a warning to them as much as anything else, Putin knows he won’t be president forever. By sustaining his office as long as possible, Putin gives himself time to pursue his two priority objectives.

First, the former KGB lieutenant colonel can continue advancing his core strategic interest: the exertion of Russia’s global influence and undermining of the U.S. alliance structure centered around NATO. Second, and most important, the Russian leader boosts the loyalty quotient of those around him. Knowing that Putin is going nowhere quickly, powerful security officials and prospective heirs to the throne will be less inclined to jockey against him. Contrary to speculative media reports, the Russian leader is in good health. To now, or soon, challenge this modern Tsar, then, is to risk flying out of a window and drowning in a swimming pool.

The core takeaway of these reforms is thus double-sided. On one side, they exemplify Putin’s immense power. But on the other side, they formalize Putin’s fear. This is not a leader who believes he can easily, happily, and safely leave office.

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