The Biden administration continues to prioritize reconciliation with Iran.
On Thursday, for example, the U.S. Treasury Department lifted sanctions on more than a dozen former officials involved in the National Iranian Oil Company, an entity that has repeatedly helped to fund the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies. President Joe Biden’s efforts appear to repeat the logic of the Obama administration in believing that it could privilege the reformist faction within the Islamic Republic by demonstrating that a more moderate, compromising approach could bring Iran financial reward.
The Biden and Obama approach stands in sharp contrast with that of the Trump administration. The former administration believed that “maximum pressure” could compel Iranian concessions, if not spark regime change. George W. Bush’s and Bill Clinton’s strategy was more a mix of the two: slapping Iran with a number of unilateral sanctions but, simultaneously, reaching out. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, for example, quietly embraced the “dialogue of civilizations,” while Bush more quietly dispatched officials like Zalmay Khalilzad and William Burns (now CIA director) to speak with Iranian officials.
While proponents of diplomacy often point to the continuation of Iranian malfeasance when the United States seeks punitive measures in order to prove conciliation to be a better strategy, the opposite can also be true. Consider that Iran grew its then-covert nuclear enrichment program and worked on warhead design while reformists controlled the presidency and dominated parliament. In short, Iran’s continued nuclear challenge is evidence that neither side’s strategy has worked.
The problem with both strategies is that they ignore the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Unlike the regular Iranian military that focuses on territorial defense, the IRGC’s mission is the defense of the revolution. That means the IRGC defends not only external enemies but also internal challenges. In 2007, then-IRGC chief Mohammad Ali Jafari reorganized the IRGC to focus more on crushing internal dissent than on facing threats on Iranian borders. He established IRGC units specific to every province in the country. In effect, they are the Praetorian Guard whose main job is to defend the supreme leader from the will of the people. In short, there can be no muddle through, gradual reform without first neutralizing the guards.
This need not mean military action.
While pundits and politicos often talk about Iranian hardliners and reformers in Iranian politics, seldom do they acknowledge that the guards are not homogeneous. Some enter the guards’ circle in various youth programs and are subject to years of indoctrination. These guardsmen may become true believers who cannot differentiate between the guards’ rhetoric and reality. Other Iranians simply join the guards for the privilege — better pay than conscript service, more subsidized goods, or greater university or employment opportunities. Even among true believers, there are fissures. Many guardsmen still suffer from injuries sustained during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Mujahedin al Khalq terrorism maimed others. Successive Iranian administrations, however, have failed to uphold even basic standards for veterans care.
Perhaps the missing piece for the U.S. is to reach out to disaffected guardsmen or those not committed to the regime’s ideological excesses. The U.S. Navy, for example, maintains two hospital ships — the USNS Mercy and the USNS Comfort. It often deploys one or the other to assist in disaster relief. A year ago, the Navy deployed the Comfort to New York City to treat COVID-19 patients. Perhaps if Biden truly wants to reach out to Iran and reinforce to Iranians that the U.S. is not their enemy, he could deploy a hospital ship to Dubai and offer free medical care for any IRGC veteran who wants it.
If IRGC veterans take the U.S. up on the offer, it would be both a propaganda and intelligence coup. On the other hand, if the regime refuses to allow IRGC veterans to access free medical care, it will highlight the regime’s own failures and increase dissent. Either way, it will chip away at the IRGC’s willingness and ability to repress the will of ordinary Iranians.
Albert Einstein is widely credited with the quip that insanity is doing the same action repeatedly but expecting different results each time. By that logic, policymakers’ refusal to recognize the ineffectiveness of both coercion and concession is madness. The U.S. needs a strategy not only to deter the IRCG but also to implode it.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
