Why Iran’s latest missile test is such a big deal

And this test is of particular concern because Iran’s focus on medium-range missiles reflects its interest in eventually deploying a credible nuclear strike force able to hit Israel and other adversary states, such as Egypt. The key here is that although Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles can hit Saudi Arabia and U.S. forces in much the region, Iran would need to rely upon medium-range missiles to hit Israel. Until last week, it was unclear whether the Khorramshahr missile actually possesd a multiple independently targetable warhead reentry vehicle. That question is now answered: Pompeo’s declaration that this missile test involved a “medium-range ballistic missile that’s capable of carrying multiple warheads” implies a high-confidence U.S. intelligence assessment that the Khorramshahr has at least a multiple warhead vehicle, if not an independently targetable vehicle. That’s why this latest test is so aggressive.

This also hints why, from a rational Iranian perspective, this latest test is so poorly timed. After all, with the U.S. putting heavy pressure on the European Union to escalate its economic pressure on Iran, and the EU predictably failing to mitigate U.S. sanctions on Iran, the Iranian economy is in free fall. While the EU would like to bolster Iran’s economy, in the context of other U.S.-EU tensions on issues such as NATO spending, and on trade (a U.S.-EU trade treaty is under negotiation), the EU faces a tough choice. Does it aggravate the U.S. by ignoring Iran’s escalating aggression? Or does it create diplomatic space with the U.S. on other issues of EU concern by now taking tougher action on Iran?

There’s good reason to think the EU might chose the latter route. Although the EU has a justified reputation for appeasing Iran, not all member states are equally weak. France and Britain, for example, are very concerned by Iran’s missile program and support escalated action. EU amenability to action is also strengthened at the broader strategic level by the fact that Iran’s ballistic missile program operates under the revolutionary guards. While the EU is keen to avoid alienating the more-moderate political bloc under Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, it has little affection for the IRGC. That brings us to the Israeli factor. Even as the EU disagrees with the U.S. and Israel over Iran’s regional threat, they recognize that the IRGC is dancing increasingly close to the ultimate Israeli red line: Iran’s nuclear strike potential. The EU is desperate to avoid Iran crossing this line and sparking Israeli military strikes that risk a regional conflagration. If the EU believes that the only way to mitigate this risk is to crack down on Iran’s ballistic missile program, it will do so.

That brings us to the final point: the possibility that last week’s missile test reflects internal Iranian tensions between the Rouhani and IRGC political blocs, and not just Iranian foreign policy. The IRGC want escalation with the west and oppose Rouhani’s desire to maintain some measure of calm in Iran’s western relations. By firing off missiles, the IRGC might be attempting to tie Rouhani’s hands against deescalation with the west. It is worth noting here that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei appears increasingly sympathetic towards the IRGC’s hardline approach.

But Iran’s latest test is at least very poorly timed. It gives Pompeo ammunition to demand tough, new EU action, and it reinforces growing European fears that the IRGC must be checked.