The killing on Saturday of al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri serves the causes of justice and global security. It is a tactical counterterrorism victory that accrues strategic benefit via a weakened al Qaeda.
Still, that Zawahiri was killed after months of residence in the Afghan capital of Kabul evinces a broader strategic loss in terms of U.S. security. It proves the increasing confidence of the Taliban and al Qaeda in reconstituting their traditional, formal relationship as ideological and practical allies.
The Taliban explicitly disavowed this relationship as part of the Trump administration-negotiated Doha agreement of February 2020. In return, the United States agreed to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. The Biden administration completed that withdrawal in August 2021, even though it was clear that the Taliban continued to engage with al Qaeda.
That brings us back to Zawahiri — because it is now clear that Zawahiri was pursuing an active and diverse range of interactions with senior Taliban leaders. That Zawahiri did so in Kabul was the obvious cause of his undoing after more than 20 years in hiding. Zawahiri’s confidence to operate in the capital was obviously informed by the Taliban’s return to power. However, at the same time, Zawahiri’s relocation to Kabul allowed for his identification: likely through the U.S. monitoring of Taliban personnel who were visiting Zawahiri or talking about him. Conversely, were the U.S. military still in Afghanistan and the Afghan government still in power, Zawahiri would likely still be alive.
The problem is that Zawahiri was only the tip, even if a big tip, of the still growing Afghanistan terrorist iceberg.
With the Taliban restored, al Qaeda and other anti-American terrorist groups have the means to reconstitute their relationships and capability. But with the U.S. military stripped out of Afghanistan, so has the U.S. intelligence presence in that nation been greatly diminished. This complicates the locating of terrorists who are skilled in operational security measures, such as the mitigation of an electronic footprint. Put simply, many more terrorists will be able to operate more freely due to the U.S. withdrawal than those who are successfully targeted by the CIA. “Over-the-horizon counterterrorism capability” offers a nice phrase, and it has some validity. But human sources and boutique mobile ground sensors remain critical to truly effective counterterrorism operations. Satellites and drones can only gather so much intelligence.
Top line: Al Qaeda is stronger for the U.S. withdrawal, even as it is temporarily weakened by Zawahiri’s demise.
