Damien Cave reports in today’s New York Times:
This is an interesting characterization in light of a post here yesterday discussing the reduced role of offensive airpower in counterinsurgency (COIN) as envisioned by the Petraeus Doctrine. In the COIN manual Petraeus authored with Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James F. Amos, the authors stated that offensive airpower should only be used when “timely, accurate intelligence, precisely delivered weapons with a demonstrated low failure rate, appropriate yield, and proper fuse” can be combined to maximize effect and minimize collateral damage. The two attacks Cave reports would seem to fit well with such a strategy, with airpower used against an al Qaeda antiaircraft cell and a bomb-making factory. There are no reports of civilian casualties in association with those strikes. And while Cave says that officials describe these two attacks as “a sign of increased use of offensive airpower in Iraq,” Colonel Garver’s more precise explanation fits better with my understanding of the Petraeus Doctrine–fewer bombs dropped, limited use of precision strikes, and a greater emphasis on “surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.”
