Is a competent North Korea ballistic missile submarine a challenge to U.S. security?
Yes, primarily because of its ability to threaten to Japan and South Korea.
Is a competent North Korea ballistic missile submarine a “game changer” for U.S. security?
No.
I note this in light of a new Center for Strategic and International Studies report. Assessing recent satellite imagery, the report suggests that North Korea is approaching the testing stage for a new class of ballistic missile submarine. NBC News’ Korea analyst Victor Cha responded by asserting, “This is a game changer. A nuclear submarine for North Korea with ballistic missiles on it, would be stealthy, it’s not like the stuff they launched from the ground that’s easily targetable.”
Cha is wrong on basically every count.
For one, this new submarine is a diesel-electric class, not a nuclear-powered submarine as Cha suggests. That power barrier means the submarine will almost certainly be limited to the Sea of Japan. That matters for U.S. security because it means the submarine can be tracked in finite launch areas, and its ballistic missiles could be tracked in their boost and midcourse stages by allied sensor platforms ringing the Sea of Japan. That will make it much more likely that we can shoot down its missiles.
But Cha’s threat assessment is wrong for other reasons, too. Let’s say that the North Korean crew somehow wanted to get out into the Pacific Ocean beyond Japan. Their problem here is that U.S. intelligence capabilities would detect the submarine if it attempted to pass Japan’s northern Hokkaido island, or north of Okinawa. Remember, the Russian Pacific Fleet is based just next to North Korea, so the U.S. has spent a long time getting to know these waters. And for the North Koreans to travel south of Okinawa means 1,000 miles before entering the Pacific.
Even then, and even if this submarine somehow reached the Pacific, it would then be tracked — and if necessary, sunk — by Virginia-class submarines from the U.S. Navy’s submarine Group Seven. Why can we be so confident? Well, submarine warfare expert H.I. Sutton notes that North Korea’s new submarine is an adaption of the 1950s Soviet Romeo-class, with battery reserves sacrificed for a three-missile payload configuration (reduced battery power means surfacing more regularly, and being more vulnerable to detection). This is a problem for the boat’s survivability. Even with some modern-era sound reduction modifications, this submarine will be extremely vulnerable to U.S. sonar. If the U.S. Navy can already hear Russia’s newest Borei-class submarine, it can definitely hear this thing.
Considering North Korean submarine ballistic missile capabilities, this submarine poses a low risk to U.S. territories such as Guam and almost no risk to Hawaii. Absent its ability to pose a credible nuclear threat to Hawaii, Kim Jong Un will know his submarine-based threat is fundamentally outweighed by U.S. nuclear counterforces. Is threatening Los Angeles worth Kim’s risking a nuclear war he will lose but at great cost to the U.S.? He may decide it is. But would this be worth merely threatening Guam? Doubtful.
This doesn’t mean that North Korea poses no nuclear threat to America or our allies. Because Cha is also wrong when he says that North Korea ground-launch ballistic missile platforms are “easily targetable.” North Korea’s Hwasong-14 class nuclear ICBM platform, for example, is mobile. While constantly monitored by the U.S. government, that mobility and North Korean terrain means Pyongyang could make it difficult for the U.S. to target all of their missiles on the ground prior to launch. And all North Korea needs is to get one missile onto a ballistic trajectory. This threat is why U.S. diplomacy and military preparation towards North Korea’s ballistic missile program is so critical.
Just don’t make Cha’s mistake of fixating on North Korea’s new submarine.
