After nearly a year and a half of diplomatic efforts, the United States has seemingly struck an agreement with the Taliban to wind down the conflict in Afghanistan.
It’s not exactly a “peace deal” as some media reports suggest, but rather a reduction-in-violence arrangement that requires Taliban fighters to put down their guns, mortars, and suicide belts for a week. The hard work of actually making peace will only occur once the weeklong truce is implemented. Even then, peace in Afghanistan is hardly a sure thing.
According to outlines of the deal as reported, the truce covers U.S. and Afghan forces across the country. Assuming no violations occur during that time (what constitutes a violation, nobody knows), Washington and the Taliban will hold a signing ceremony on Feb. 29. Talks between the Taliban, the Afghan government, and other stakeholders will go ahead 10 days after the signing. The Trump administration will begin gradual reductions in U.S. troop presence. But when asked whether a full withdrawal is predicated on the Afghans making peace with each other, something that hasn’t happened in over 40 years, U.S. officials didn’t say much.
No sane person on earth wants the war in Afghanistan to continue. Even the Taliban have indicated that they are tired of fighting. The group wouldn’t be at the table talking about a way out otherwise. For the Afghan people, tens of thousands of whom have been killed since the conflict began, any cessation of violence would be a gift. Were these negotiations to break down, every Afghan man, woman, and child would have to prepare themselves for more violence.
As the deal now stands, thousands of U.S. troops would remain on the ground as the intra-Afghan peace talks progress. If the Afghans reach a political settlement, those troops would presumably pack up, fly home, and leave Afghanistan in the rearview mirror.
It sounds reasonable enough, but by linking U.S. withdrawals to success at the negotiating table, the Trump administration is creating a situation where American forces could very well be stuck in the country years into the future. If Washington is measuring success in terms of the highly diverse Afghan stakeholders coming to a consensus on how Afghanistan’s politics are structured and how political power is distributed, success may never be within reach.
Some would label this attitude as defeatism, but it’s just realism. If politics in Afghanistan were easy, the country would not have entered its 41st consecutive year at war last December.
U.S. troops aren’t chips to be gambled away at a poker table. They are human beings with their own aspirations and goals for the future. They have loved ones back home. Very few voters believe it’s the U.S. military’s responsibility to stop the Taliban and Afghan security forces from killing each other until the end of time. Do U.S. policymakers disagree?
Defense Secretary Mark Esper is right when he says that any deal with the Taliban entails risk. The Taliban’s command-and-control is not foolproof. Afghanistan has so many spoilers that it’s frankly more surprising if violations don’t occur. And U.S. negotiators can never be 100% certain that the Taliban is really interested in governing with the Afghan government, which the organization derides as a stooge for foreign occupation forces.
But there is also a big risk in keeping U.S. troops in Afghanistan for eternity. For one reason or another, that discussion often gets swept under the rug.
