It is possible that North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un is suddenly “committed to denuclearization,” as South Korean National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong claimed in comments to the press at the White House Thursday evening.
It’s further possible that the result of a one-on-one meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un will “achieve permanent denuclearization,” as he predicted.
And it’s possible that Trump’s “leadership and his maximum pressure policy” have in fact led Kim Jong-un to so fear for his survival that he’s decided to give up the nuclear program his country has suffered decades to obtain—and to do so just as he’s on the verge of accomplishing the long-held objectives of his predecessors.
It’s possible we’ll look back on this development in two years, or five years, and view it as the moment the North Koreans finally agreed to do the one thing they’ve been determined not to do, at tremendous cost, for two generations. All of this, I suppose, is possible.
But none of it is likely. More than that: It’s almost inconceivable.
Here’s a much more likely explanation for what is happening: Kim Jong-un, on the verge of having a nuclear weapon deliverable to the United States, is seeking to deflate the maximum pressure campaign before it really takes effect. The North Korean leader didn’t have to commit to anything in writing apparently, with a White House official telling reporters the “message was conveyed orally” through the South Koreans—South Koreans who have made clear, repeatedly and publicly, that they’re desperate for a deal of some kind, any kind.
Kim Jong-un—and his father and grandfather before him—have long sought these kind of high-level meetings with top U.S. officials. Appearing with American leaders confers legitimacy on the regime and enhances its stature on the world stage. The very fact of the meeting would be a diplomatic win for the North.
The nuclear program is the core of the North Korean regime, at the center of the regime’s identity. The leadership believes, correctly, that the nuclear program explains why the United States and other global heavyweights have been willing to negotiate and offer goodies for some three decades. The bad behavior of the regime—development, testing, proliferating—has been consistently rewarded by the US and its allies because of the progress toward nuclearization.
In the days before Thursday’s news, U.S. officials were downplaying the idea of negotiations. “In terms of direct talks with the United States—and you asked negotiations, and we’re a long way from negotiations,” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told reporters hours before the announcement. And Vice President Mike Pence said on Tuesday, “our posture toward the regime will not change until we see credible, verifiable and concrete steps” toward denuclearization.
We didn’t see credible, verifiable and concrete steps toward denuclearization, of course. We got instead a promise from a regime that doesn’t keep promises, to do a thing it has avoided doing for decades, and the possibility of a meeting.
And how might such a meeting go? Kim could be the tough guy he’s been in public, provoking a confrontation in the meeting and taking his chances. Or he could tell Trump that he’d never thought he’d be in a position where he had to make a deal but Trump’s maximum pressure campaign was so effective he’d been left with no choice. Trump, pleased to hear this, will be all the more eager to make a deal. For him, the achievement will be the deal itself (remember his willingness to sign anything on health care). He will eagerly tout his triumph — the White House and its supporters are touting this meeting as a big win. And having prematurely declared victory, Trump will have little incentive to call North Korea on its violations of whatever deal emerges because doing so would suggest that he got played. So North Korea flips the dynamic. Instead of the U.S. scrutinizing every move, poised to take decisive action if we perceive an escalating threat, the U.S.—or at least its leader—will be incentivized to downplay violations and threats for fear of jeopardizing the diplomatic achievement that the deal represents. (See Obama and the Iran deal).
Beyond that, Kim almost certainly believes that he’ll be able to extract concessions from Trump in a face-to-face meeting, perhaps even get Trump to agree to things he’s on record opposing. And he’s not crazy for believing this. You may recall two high-profile meetings between President Trump and members of Congress about immigration and guns, where the president found himself agreeing to all sorts of positions floated by his opponents.
Trump met with Republican and Democrat leaders at the White House on January 9 to discuss a compromise on immigration. Trump allowed television cameras to remain in the room as the negotiations unfolded. The White House was seeking a deal that would allow the 700,000 children of illegal immigrants in the United States to remain, in exchange for restrictions on legal immigration and tougher border security.
At one point, Senator Dianne Feinstein asked for a vote on a “clean DACA bill,” something Democrats had been pushing and Republicans, including those at the White House, had long rejected. Trump shocked everyone in the room by indicating that he’d support such a clean DACA bill. House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy gently stepped in to correct the president. “Mr. President, you need to be clear, though. I think what Senator Feinstein is asking there — when we talk about just DACA, we don’t want to be back here two years later. You have to have security.”
“I think that’s what she’s saying,” Trump replied.
“No, I think she’s saying something different,” McCarthy said, correctly understanding Feinstein’s proposal. Trump didn’t take McCarthy’s advice. He accepted Feinstein’s position while she was in the room and walked this acceptance back only later.
The president did the same thing at a meeting about guns on February 28. Leading members of Congress discussed new legislative proposals after the shooting in Parkland, Florida. Feinstein, who authored an assault weapons ban back in the mid-1990s, was hoping to revive those restrictions—a nonstarter with most Republicans and a policy strongly opposed by many of Trump’s top advisers. But as the legislators discussed the assault weapons ban and a domestic violence proposal offered by Senator Amy Klobuchar, Trump jumped in, seeming to endorse both.
“So if you can add that to this bill,” Trump said, addressing Klobuchar, “that would be great. Dianne, if you could add what you have also and I think you can into the bill.” Feinstein reacted with glee and asked Trump to help. “I’ll help,” Trump said before asking Senator Joe Manchin, co-author of the underlying legislation, to make sure the Klobuchar and Feinstein provisions were included.
The president later added: “I would say this, we’re going to get it passed. We’re going to get it passed. If you can add domestic violence paragraphs, pages into this bill, I’m all for it. I think it’s terrific if you can do it. It can be done. That could be done too.”
Trump is an impulsive decision maker. He’s susceptible to flattery. He likes to please the people in front of him at any given moment, so he often says things to win their immediate approval, ignoring the longer-term consequences of what he’s said. In the aftermath of these two meetings, White House staffers and Republican lawmakers moved quickly to explain that Trump hadn’t meant what he’d said.
And you can’t assume that detailed, rigorous planning can prevent such missteps. Top White House staffers worked closely with GOP congressional leaders for weeks to ensure that rank-and-file Republicans would vote to reauthorize the intelligence community’s 702 surveillance program, even asking CIA Director Mike Pompeo to make calls and to provide mini-tutorials for wavering legislators. The night before the vote, the White House put out a statement declaring Trump’s support for the program. But the following morning, apparently after watching a segment on Fox & Friends, Trump tweeted wondering aloud if the program in question had been the one he’s alleged intelligence officials abused to “wiretap Trump Tower.”
I suspect that none of this is lost on Kim Jong-un. And foreign diplomacy is different than domestic policy-making. You can walk back something the president says during a meeting with Democrats and the downside is minimal: Embarrassment and confusion, mostly.
But if the president were to commit to something in a meeting with a hostile head of state and then try to walk it back after the fact? That’s a different matter altogether. Kim Jong-un is not a legislator bound to accept Trump’s changing whims. And walking back the foreign policy commitments of the president of the United States could be dangerous for the entire world. Strategic ambiguity is one thing. Chaotic confusion is quite another.
Trump deserves credit for abandoning the failed approach to North Korea preferred by his predecessors, Democrats and Republicans alike: diplomacy for the sake of diplomacy, marked by preemptive concessions, with few consequences for North Korean misbehavior—all built on the flawed assumption that China shares our interests on North Korea. And the White House is right to claim that this new approach has changed the dynamic between the US and North Korea.
We should all wish Trump well in this hazardous undertaking. I certainly do. But choosing to change a failed approach, however laudable, does not guarantee success.
