The US sold weapons that ended up in terrorists’ hands, and Congress shrugs

It turns out that selling tens of billions of dollars in high-priced U.S. military equipment to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over the last several years hasn’t been a particularly wise idea. While it’s true that American defense companies make a hefty profit, the weapons, vehicles, bombs, and bullets sold overseas are often used in ways that are completely antithetical to U.S. national security interests.

CNN’s blockbuster report detailing how U.S.-made weapons platforms have been diverted by the Saudi and Emirati governments to their favorite armed factions in Yemen is but the latest example of an unregulated and counterproductive U.S. arms export policy. According to the report, “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates … have used the US-manufactured weapons as a form of currency to buy the loyalties of [Yemeni] militias or tribes, bolster chosen armed actors, and influence the complex political landscape.”

Oshkosh armored vehicles have been found in the arsenals of designated Sunni jihadist groups. TOW anti-tank missiles sold to the Saudi-led coalition have been airdropped by Riyadh into areas where al Qaeda militants are known to operate. Mine-resistant vehicles sold to the UAE have been spotted on the ground in Yemen under the control of UAE-supported Salafist militias. None of these diversions are legal, and Washington has not authorized a single transfer to a third party.

The Defense Department has initiated an investigation into the CNN report. But the major conclusion is already written: Again and again, U.S. weapons exports to governments in the Middle East have eventually bitten the U.S. in the backside, a blowback many policymakers and lawmakers in Washington have carelessly explained away as aberrations or misunderstandings.

Examples of U.S. weapons falling into the hands of bad actors could make up a book of encyclopedia-like length.

There was the time when corrupt Jordanian logistical officers siphoned truckloads of U.S.-shipped weapons to the black arms market at a healthy profit — some of which the FBI discovered were responsible for the killing of two American contractors in a shooting incident. There was the time when the Islamic State captured mountains of small arms, ammunition, tanks, and armored personnel carriers (weapons Washington sold to Baghdad over a period of years at a cost of $22 billion) when the terrorist group swept through Iraqi army bases in northern Iraq. There have been instances when the Iraqi government has given heavy weapons earmarked for the army to Shia militias with horrible human rights records. And U.N. investigators have previously documented American-manufactured “Archangel” fixed-wing aircraft sold to the UAE in Eastern Libya, presumably for the purposes of providing air support to Gen. Khalifa Hiftar’s Libyan National Army.

In all of these cases, American guns and military technology have been misused by the very countries that market themselves as strategic partners. The response from lawmakers is best described as a collective shrug. Eventually, when the news cycle moves on, the tap is turned back on.

Washington cannot continue to allow this to happen. Foreign governments that break the rules by transferring U.S. arms to unauthorized groups or use them in such a way that negatively affects the safety and security of the American public can no longer be given the benefit of the doubt. Nations that flout the contract should not be given access to the best military platforms money can buy.

Lawmakers have it within their power to be far more aggressive and proactive on arms sales. Rather than deferring to the executive branch whenever a request for a sale is transmitted to Capitol Hill, it is the responsibility of Congress to perform due diligence and ask the big questions before granting approval. Is the recipient country responsible enough to use the weapons wisely in the event of a conflict? Does the country seeking to buy the weapons or technology have a durable monitoring system in place to prevent possible leakage? Will the specific country abide by end-user agreements? And above all, does a prospective sale help the U.S. achieve its foreign policy goals or indirectly entangle the United States into civil wars and internal conflicts that it has no interest meddling in?

Just like Washington could use more restraint in its foreign policy and spending practices, it could also use more restraint on arms sales. It’s time for the Beltway to exercise better judgment: think first, sell later — if at all.

Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a fellow at Defense Priorities.

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