President Trump’s order to reduce the United States’s military presence in Germany from 36,000 to 24,000 personnel has positive and negative elements.
One odd element of the order, announced on Wednesday, is the tension between Trump’s stated intent and the reality on the ground. The president says the order punishes Germany for its long record of inadequate defense spending. But while it’s true that Germany’s defense record is at odds with NATO alliance expectations, many of the forces being pulled from Germany are going to Belgium. If Trump wants to punish low defense spending, that choice of relocation is very odd. After all, Belgium spends even less on defense as a percentage of GDP than Germany!
What of the plan’s other considerations? Is Defense Secretary Mark Esper accurate in saying that it will strengthen NATO’s deterrence mission?
Yes and no.
On the positive side, we have the relocation of an F-16 fighter squadron and elements of a fighter wing to Italy. While Italy spends below the NATO 2%-of-GDP target, its geographic location offers proximity to a rising Russian threat. That being said, the Russian air force, air defense, and navy challenge NATO’s southern flank. Primary concerns here are Russian submarine forces and a rising threat from Russian fighter jets to U.S. aircraft monitoring those submarines. Another challenge comes from Russia’s use of Libya as a staging base for long-range air defense area denial systems. While there is already a U.S. Air Force F-16 squadron in Italy, adding another adds flexibility.
Another strong point is Esper’s pledge that the redeployment will support increased deployments, presumably including Stryker Brigades, to the Baltic states and Black Sea area. Increased U.S. infantry operations in both of those areas would reinforce NATO’s flanks where they are most vulnerable. In the context of rising Turkish-Russian tensions over Libya and Syria, the deployments might also help draw Turkey back into the NATO fold.
Then, there’s the Pentagon’s plan “to rotate forward the lead element of the Army’s 5th Corps headquarters to Poland.” This would be a very positive development. Benefiting from strong funding and leadership, Poland’s military is increasingly impressive. A strong U.S. ally right alongside the Baltics, Poland hosting a corps headquarters would send a long-term message of deterrence to Vladimir Putin.
There are negatives, however.
For one, there’s the Pentagon’s redeployment of 6,400 personnel back to the U.S. While the U.S. has very justifiable complaints concerning Europe’s failure to support NATO, it’s a mistake to reduce total U.S. troop levels on the continent. It plays to a key Putin narrative, accepted in European capitals, that the Trump administration is an unreliable ally.
Also odd is what this plan doesn’t include. If Esper’s intent was to boost NATO credibility, he could easily have added rotational announcements in support of that agenda. Why not, for example, announce plans to rotate F-22 fighter squadrons or B-2 bomber squadrons through Europe? U.S. Air Force bases in Britain have the capacity to host and maintain these advanced aircraft, and Britain meets the 2%-of-GDP target. Esper might also have directed a European air assault exercise by the 101st Airborne Division. Because of that unit’s legacy in the European theater of World War II, such an exercise would have boosted NATO’s credibility against Russian air defense strategy and generated favorable European political and media attention.
As I say, this plan is a very mixed bag.
