With the ongoing imbroglio over Senator McCain’s comments linking Iran and al Qaeda, it is worth reviewing what Saddam’s own files have to say about Iran’s support for al Qaeda. Not only do Saddam’s Intelligence files confirm that his regime had a significant relationship with al Qaeda, but they also provide more evidence of Iran’s hand in al Qaeda’s terror. Some may say this is impossible: How could two states that hated each other as much as Saddam’s Iraq and the mullah’s Iran support the same terrorist group(s)? However, such thinking is very narrow-minded. The IPP study proposes that we think of our terrorist enemies as cartels. In this sense, each of these parties competes in some important ways, but they are also capable of collaborating when it suits their interests. The IPP’s paradigm for understanding terrorism is very similar to the one Michael Ledeen proposed in his book, The War Against the Terror Masters. Ledeen has proposed that our terrorist enemies are best compared to rival mafia families, who can bitterly fight one another only to band together when facing a common foe, like law enforcement agencies. James Woolsey, the former head of the CIA, has proposed a similar way of understanding modern Islamic terrorism as well. For Woolsey, terrorist organizations and their sponsors are capable of forming “joint ventures” to fulfill their common interests–e.g. attacking Americans. Numerous examples of such collaboration can be found throughout the history of Middle Eastern and Islamic terrorism. For example, Yasser Arafat and his PLO allied with both Iraq and Iran at various points throughout Arafat’s terrorist career. Hamas, a terrorist group which is the ideological cousin of al Qaeda and likewise an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has drawn support from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and previously Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Today, the Sunni Hamas is strongly allied with Iran. And the man who served as Osama bin Laden’s protector and mentor from 1991 through mid-1996, Hassan al-Turabi, was quite open about his relationships with both Saddam Hussein (who he called a “close” ally) and the Iranian Mullahs. Turabi turned his Sudan into a melting pot of terrorism, bringing together disparate groups under a common anti-Western, anti-American banner. (See here and here for my two part series on Turabi.) This does not mean that Saddam’s Iraq and Iran necessarily had to cooperate with each other (although they did when it came to illicit deals under the oil-for-food program), just that each was capable of supporting terrorist groups that shared their immediate interests.
So, then, we should not be surprised to find that Iraq’s intelligence files contain evidence of Iran’s support for an especially violent al Qaeda affiliate: the Algerian GSPC, previously known as the GIA. As noted in my last post, Saddam Hussein’s regime clearly made common cause with the GIA and GSPC at various times. But according to an Iraqi Intelligence file, Iran also played a prominent role in sponsoring the GIA/GSPC as well as other armed Islamic groups fighting an insurgency against the Algerian regime. These groups are Sunni, and the principal opposition group is openly allied with al Qaeda, yet Iran (with help from Syria) had no trouble being one of the “most important” countries to support them. From an Iraqi Intelligence memo dated September 10, 1999 (emphasis added):
So, Saddam’s intelligence services told him that Iran was directly sponsoring al Qaeda’s Algerian affiliate. Of course, the Algerian government knew that too; they even temporarily cut off diplomatic relations with Iran in 1993 because of it. The GSPC is today one of al Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliates, and openly threatens Europe. So, U.S. counterterrorism officials should be very concerned about Iran’s longstanding support for this group, as evidenced even in Saddam Hussein’s intelligence files.
