Chinese state media is ramping up its vitriolic anti-American rants, a sure sign of Xi Jinping’s displeasure with President Trump. But Xi’s pressure is coming in other forms as well.
Chinese fighter jets are escalating their dangerous interception of U.S. military aircraft in international airspace. Xi is moving to crush Hong Kong’s democratic rule of law. And Chinese cyber forces are conducting a global cyberespionage campaign to steal coronavirus-related data, as well as all other data of value.
In this context of rising tensions, Xi may use North Korea as a new pressure point against Washington. North Korea offers a key advantage to Xi: a means by which to strain Washington without appearing to do so and while simultaneously offering leverage as a means of reducing the pressure — leverage with the strings attached of reciprocal concessions to China. This is Beijing’s old game: pretending to have little influence over the Pyongyang leadership, then using its substantial influence to either increase or decrease North Korea’s pressure on the United States, South Korea, and Japan.
There are risks to this approach, especially if the U.S. finds out what Beijing is doing.
Still, China takes clever steps to mitigate that risk. This involves, for example, the use of human couriers to deliver messages to the North Koreans and vice versa. The tactic mitigates the risk of U.S. and South Korean intelligence services finding out what Xi is telling Kim at any one moment — a concern that takes on added importance in light of the extensive U.S. intelligence monitoring effort dedicated to Kim’s person.
Of course, were Xi to request Kim conduct a new nuclear weapons test or a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, it would pose major risks for Kim.
Those actions might well lead to new U.S sanctions and Trump’s abandonment of a detente-based diplomatic track. And while North Korea has been hinting at of preparation for new escalations, Kim would be reluctant to do so at Xi’s order. Kim is obsessed with internal regime politics and would fear that being seen to take orders from Xi would make him look weak.
On the other hand, ignoring Xi’s request would pose its own problems. It would risk China cutting off its critical land- and sea-based trade lifeline to Pyongyang. That would cripple the always creaking North Korean economy, again, potentially jeopardizing Kim’s domestic leadership position.
Ultimately, Xi might not even make a request of Kim. But considering the rapidly escalating tensions between Beijing and Washington, I believe that possibility is becoming increasingly likely.
