President Trump continues to push for the creation of a Space Force, a new U.S. military branch focused on protecting American interests in space. Legislation creating the Space Force will likely be included in the next defense budget and a proposal may be ready by October 15.
Until then, the big question is how much it will cost. One of the few official cost estimates is found in a September 14 memo by Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson. The Space Force, it says, “will cost more than $3 billion in its first year and an additional $10 billion over the four following years.”
According to a different memo by Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan, the military is already creating a new unified combatant command and satellite acquisition agency for the Space Force—two steps just short of organizing an actual branch (they need Congress to approve that).
Although America can do a better job of defending its assets in space, it also shouldn’t be wasting billions of dollars. There are two things the government can do to reduce the cost of the Space Force.
First, make full use of international space law to avoid another arms race reminiscent of the Cold War. Second, make sure that the Space Force has a clear and narrow mission.
The use of international space law is one tool the U.S. can use to avoid a bloated Space Force budget. Although international space law is sometimes ignored or broken, it has still helped prevent a major and expensive arms race in space. In today’s context, the update of old laws—or possibly the creation of new ones—could keep rival powers like Russia and China from putting new weapons in orbit. The advantage of an international space law approach is that it offers wide benefits that come far cheaper than arms races and new orbital weapon systems. In addition, America can always defend itself if the law fails—and that is where the Space Force would come in.
For instance, there are two main treaties that underpin international space law: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Registration Convention of 1976. These largely prevented an arms race and the placement of nuclear weapons in space even during the Cold War. Furthermore, the Liability Convention of 1972 established procedures for determining liability for damages made by other governments to properties in space. One problem that led to calls for a Space Force in the first place is the fact that many countries operate dual-use satellites or spaceships that are needed for repair, exploration, or cleaning space trash but also have potential military uses. These assets could also be used hack, capture, disable, or destroy other objects during war. If the existing international space laws were updated to account for how to manage these dual-use assets—such as establishing legal distances between satellites—the risk of an arms race and frenzied spending could be reduced.
A Space Force could help secure critical U.S. satellites and space assets against physical or cyberattack. Given that all bets are off during wartime, having some kind of improved and unified Space Force makes sense. But that new branch must also adhere to a strict and clear mission—such as security in both the physical cyber-realms—or else it will succumb to mission creep. The danger is that another military branch would, like other government programs, start off small but end up continuously expanding its missions in order to justify its existence and fight for a bigger slice of the budget. America needs military branches and units with precise objectives, not another sprawling bureaucracy building useless boondoggles like star destroyers.
History shows that averting purposeless expansion of government and the waste of taxpayer dollars is difficult to avoid. But when an organization is started from scratch, there is a chance to create new expectations, a new culture, and a new set of rules. In this case, America has an opportunity to improve its security while also avoiding a bloated Space Force. The only question is whether we will take it.
John Dale Grover is an Assistant Managing Editor for The National Interest, a fellow at Defense Priorities, and a writer for Young Voices.
