Taiwan is a democratic partner that the United States has pledged to support. That support takes on escalating importance as Taiwan faces a rapidly rising threat from Beijing. But the U.S. government must proceed cautiously as it frames how best to provide that support. Miscalculation carries great danger: undesired war and the corollary risk of American bodies at the bottom of the East China Sea.
Risk management, then, should be the rule of America’s evolving strategy here. But that’s not to say America should flee from risk. Indeed, the U.S. must be willing to entertain more fury from China to help secure Taiwan. That means boosting Taiwan’s ability to deter invasion, and supporting an alliance of nations in Taiwan’s support.
At a basic level, this means selling Taipei more weapons that give it added means of holding any Chinese invasion force at bay. More anti-ship missiles, in particular, but also improved radar and sonar sensor nets, redundant air defense networks, and strengthened air forces. The Trump administration’s decision to sell Taiwan F-16V fighter jets and Harpoon anti-ship missiles is a step in the right direction. But the administration could also encourage other high-end defense exporters such as Britain, France, and Germany to offer more of their better equipment to Taiwan. German submarines would be of particular value.
There is a balance to strike here. The U.S. should not sell Taiwan the highest-end weapons platforms, such as the F-22 and F-35 strike fighters, and the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, system. Such sales would risk Beijing’s intelligence apparatus learning how to better defeat those platforms. But even the announcement of such a sale would increase the likelihood of Beijing taking preemptive action to seize Taiwan before those systems could be fully deployed.
That brings up another issue: the Pentagon factor. Successive U.S. administrations have refused to be drawn on whether they would order direct U.S. military action in support of Taiwan. The silence is sensible. While U.S. attack submarines could wreak havoc on the Chinese Navy, U.S. bombers and missiles would struggle to dent amphibious forces. In addition, China would view such involvement as a justification for action against the U.S. homeland, something that might quickly sour an American populace, most of whom likely could not find Taiwan on a map. Then there’s the ability of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles to put U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups at risk, denying them freedom of action. As I say, prudence and an honest assessment of costs and strategic interests is crucial.
Still, the only thing that Xi Jinping wants more than to bring Taiwan back under Beijing’s submission is not to be defeated in a conflict with Taiwan. Xi and the Chinese Communist Party fear that such a defeat would reverberate across the mainland and the world. Images of Chinese warships aflame and sinking may spread the mental image of a different China in the eyes of its 1.4 billion people. If that happens, the international community might not see China as a rising behemoth to be dealt with deferentially, but rather as a dragon without fire.
On that point, the U.S. should not neglect the need to consolidate Taiwan’s international relationships. The leadership of courageous democratic politicians such as Czech speaker Milos Vystrcil are positive. But they should be built upon. One way the U.S. can have outsize effect here would be to reciprocate Chinese sanctions that are imposed on any governments that bolster their links with Taipei. Fortunately, President Tsai has already made great leaps in advancing her nation’s prestige and its reputation for plucky resolve.
Ultimately, these calibrated steps would seem to be the best way to improve Taiwan’s security and strengthen its sovereignty over time, and in a way that mitigates the probability of China taking military force to dominate the island nation. The objective here should be Beijing’s gradual acceptance of a status quo with Taiwan. Not a major conflict.
