When the Chinese Communist Party holds its 20th congress this Sunday, many eyes around the world will be watching. General Secretary Xi Jinping is poised to launch a third term in office, a move we haven’t seen since the end of the Mao Zedong era.
But the truth is there’s nothing to see here. China’s party congress is the country’s most important political event because of its symbolic value, not any practical functions. By shining a spotlight on this political ritual, the West is mostly just lending legitimacy to the CCP.
XI’S STRATEGY IN THE US-CHINA CHIP WAR
The mere fact that the party congress is happening means that there are no real uncertainties around key policy issues facing Beijing. In his book China’s Party Congress, Stanford University political scientist Guoguang Wu, who advised former premier Zhao Ziyang prior to 1989 on political reform, detailed just how symbolic the political conference is. Unlike a legislature in a democracy, the CCP’s congress is not for making significant decisions but rather for cementing those already made by its leadership — or, in today’s China, by Xi himself.
Observers often refer to China’s party congress convening once every five years, but that’s only a convention since 1977. Before that, the meeting took place rather irregularly and was often delayed for years when Mao felt that his absolute dominance was in any trace of doubt. Even after 1977, the party congress could take place anywhere from September to November of a year, depending on how ready the Chinese leader felt he was at the time.
When the congress does convene, there will be no room for any deviations from the general secretary’s will. Party delegates have the right to cast their ballots for the party leadership, including the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the CCP’s top ruling body, but there are no more candidates than seats to fill. Yet there’s a “preparatory election” before the final fake vote, so delegates can make sure that they are really doing it right. The purpose of these rituals is not to waste everyone’s time. Rather, Wu argued, by imitating the appearance of voting and other democratic institutions, the CCP creates a false sense of participation among its delegates and uses it to legitimize its own rule. For this reason, challenges and uncertainties have no place in the symbolic exercise.
While China watchers in the West may have their reasons for bringing the events of the congress to the public’s attention, they should not give it undue attention in a way that boosts the CCP’s legitimacy. Countless news reports and analyses are opining on what to watch for at the gathering when there’s really nothing to expect. There’s even a fantasy football-style game for predicting who will make it to the party’s top ruling body.
Beijing wisely capitalizes on Western attention. The 15th congress in 1997 was the first in which journalists from outside mainland China were allowed to report on the gathering. China’s propaganda machinery was quickly overjoyed to see the foreign attention grow. By the CCP’s account, the number of overseas reporters covering the meetings rose from about 600 at the 16th congress in 2002 to over 1,800 at the last congress in 2017. Of course, the coverage was, allegedly, overwhelmingly positive. Whether it actually was doesn’t matter to Beijing.
Observers’ desire to understand the Chinese regime is understandable, especially since the stakes are higher year after year while Beijing’s decision-making is not getting any less opaque. But amplifying the CCP’s messages is counterproductive. The highly touted party congress is China’s purposeful political ritual, and it should be treated as nothing more than that.
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
Weifeng Zhong is a senior research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and a core developer of the open-sourced Policy Change Index project. He’s also the curator of the Wei To Think Again newsletter on U.S.-China competition.
