Gaza, the day after: There is reason for optimism, but few good options will remain after the war

Aristotle famously observed that “it is not enough to win a war; it is more important to organize the peace.” But in the Middle East, peace is temporary at best and elusive at worst. However, the Greek philosopher’s point remains: The postwar period will be essential to both Israel’s security, as well as the stability of the region. The challenges are daunting. But there is reason for optimism as well.

Militarily, Israel is winning the war — and winning it handily. For the Jewish state, it is a war of necessity, not choice.

War was brought to Israel’s doorstep on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas and other Iranian proxies invaded and perpetrated the largest massacre of Jewish civilians since the Holocaust. More than 1,200 Israelis were murdered, often in gruesome fashion. Parents were tortured in front of their children, babies slaughtered in their cribs, the elderly shot at bus stops or set on fire in their own homes. Hamas livestreamed the barbarism, proudly sharing its atrocities. The terrorist group also seized roughly 240 hostages, including foreign nationals, and took them back to Gaza, where many were subjected to abuses, including rape, molestation, and starvation. 

The slaughter, known in some circles as the Simchat Torah Massacre, named after the Jewish holiday on which it occurred, shocked both Israel and much of the world.

For years, arguably since Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip in 2007, the Israeli security establishment had operated under the doctrine of “mowing the grass.” As defense analysts Shoshana and Stephen Bryen wrote, this was the idea that the Gaza-based terrorist group could be managed. Hamas and its fellow proxies, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees, and others, would continue to control the Gaza Strip, and Israel would periodically carry out targeted military operations aimed at reducing, but not eliminating, their capability. 

The strategy was born from the recognition that a large-scale operation, costly in both blood and treasure, would be necessary to root out Hamas and that the costs might be more than Israel could bear. Instead, it was hoped that Hamas could be held at bay. It was a strategy embraced by Israeli leaders of various political stripes and encouraged by Israel’s foremost patron and ally, the United States. The Simchat Torah Massacre revealed its bankruptcy. 

When Israel launched its military operations, its defense and political leaders were clear on their objective. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Oct. 28, the goals were “destroying Hamas’s military and governing capabilities.” Public opinion polls show that these sentiments are broad and widespread. Israeli society overwhelmingly recognizes the need to destroy the genocidal terrorist organization.

Some in Washington expressed skepticism of Israel’s war aims, viewing them as overly ambitious. But Jerusalem has proved the critics wrong, making rapid military advancements and incurring fewer military casualties than anticipated. 

For its part, Hamas has relied on what former Pentagon official Doug Feith called a “strategy of human sacrifice.” As Feith observed, in the annals of war, it is “unprecedented for a party to adopt a war strategy to maximize civilian deaths on its own side.” Yet this is exactly what Hamas has done. 

Worse still, many in the legacy media are complicit. As the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis has documented, the press are key to implementing Hamas’s strategy. The terrorist group counts on journalists to repeat casualty statistics supplied by the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry. The statistics are unreliable: Among other things, they don’t distinguish between civilians and combatants. Hamas has both a clear incentive and a history of inflating the numbers of those killed. Hamas hopes to poison world opinion against the Jewish state.

Israel may be scoring victories on the battlefield, but Hamas has been able to exert influence in the war of public opinion. And this will prove crucial as Israel enters the next phase of its campaign against the terrorist organization. 

Israel may be winning militarily, but it can still lose diplomatically and politically. Indeed, the postwar phase of Gaza will be a battle of its own. 

Many of Israel’s detractors have claimed that the nation wants to conquer Gaza, turning it into an imperial holding. Yet the opposite is true. In fact, aside from Hamas, no one wants to rule Gaza, least of all Israel. Indeed, this reluctance to occupy the Gaza Strip helped fuel support for Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy. And in many ways, it is at the core of Israel’s postwar problems.

Israel previously ruled the Gaza Strip. The Jewish state seized the enclave from Egypt after its successful defense in the 1967 Six-Day War. Subsequently, Israel held on to the territory until it decided to withdraw unilaterally in 2005. 

In Israel’s absence, Hamas rose to power. History tells us that Israel is right. Hamas must not be permitted a role in postwar Gaza. Hamas has brought only ruin and death to Palestinians and Israelis alike. 

Hamas is an Islamist movement akin to al Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, and others. It explicitly seeks Israel’s destruction and the brutal subjugation of those who don’t subscribe to its brand of Islamic rule. 

As Hamas notes in its own covenant, the terrorist group has its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood and has had a presence in the area, including in Gaza, that dates to the 1930s — more than a decade before Israel’s re-creation in 1948. Indeed, Muslim Brotherhood operatives played a role in the Arab coalition that formed to try and beat the fledgling Jewish state in its war of independence. 

Hamas formally came into being in the 1980s, when Israel still ruled Gaza. Iran soon began to support Hamas, whose operatives trained with fellow Iranian proxies in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Yet as long as Israel ruled Gaza, it continued to maintain an intelligence and security apparatus that helped thwart Hamas’s long-term ambitions.

After Israel withdrew, Hamas handily beat Fatah, its rival for power, in elections in 2006. They would prove to be the last elections that Gazans would vote in. Shortly thereafter, the two groups fought a brief but bloody civil war. Hamas won that, too, expelling Fatah from the Gaza Strip. Soon Hamas began to launch rockets at the Jewish state, prompting the first of many wars with Israel, with the Israel Defense Forces launching Operation Cast Lead in 2008. Other conflicts followed, including in 2012, 2014, and 2021. In each instance, Hamas used human shields, often launching indiscriminate attacks at Israelis from behind the cover of schools, hospitals, and other population centers — a double war crime.

For their part, polls have shown that a large number of Gazans do support Hamas. In fact, support for Hamas often seems to peak after large-scale attacks on Israelis, such as the Oct. 7 massacre. But this doesn’t mean that Gazans are simpatico with Hamas rulers. Indeed, on several occasions, Gazans have stood up in protest, often against living conditions created by the terrorist group’s kleptocratic rule.

In March 2019, Gazans took to the streets in what became known as the “Hunger Revolution.” They held signs that said, “We want to live the same life of luxury, money, and cars as Hamas’ leaders’ sons.” Hamas responded with characteristic brutality, shooting protesters. The slaughter, however, was widely ignored by Western news outlets and the “Squad” of anti-Israel lawmakers such as Reps. Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) and Ilhan Omar (D-MN).

Following Israel’s military response to Oct. 7, Hamas has stolen aid, wielding it as a weapon against its own people. Hamas has seized food, medical supplies, and fuel, among other necessities, making a profit on the black market. While many Gazans have been forced to go without, Hamas has been well stocked. Risking death, some brave Palestinians have even vocally condemned Hamas before news cameras — a rare and risky occurrence in a society governed by fear.

Like other Islamist groups, Hamas has proven ill-suited to governing. Its raison d’être is to murder Jews. Virtually everything, including infrastructure, a functioning economy, and healthcare, is perverted to this end. A Hamas role in “governing” Gaza will only ensure more Oct. 7s, more war, and more deaths.

Yet Hamas will not give up power easily. Like other terrorist groups, its operatives will likely attempt to lay low and blend in, biding their time and building their strength. It’s an old playbook, and Hamas has reason to think that it can carry it out. 

Hamas speaks to a desire that is all too widespread. A belief that the existence of the Jewish state is a historical aberration whose final days are coming. Until recently, Hamas has gained power and support by literally gaining ground and showing that an uncompromising stance can shake what it considers to be the “Zionist occupier.” 

Hamas’s popularity might be ebbing now as it experiences military defeat, but in the terrorist group’s collective mind, it will only take another successful massacre of Jews to gain back legitimacy. For this reason, a heavy security presence in postwar Gaza will be essential to preventing a return of Hamas and ensuring long-term stability. Yet, for a number of reasons, this is a catch-22.

Gazans don’t want Israelis there, and Israel’s government has been equally clear it has “no desire to govern Gaza,” as Netanyahu said in November. For its part, the Biden administration has suggested that the Palestinian Authority, the entity dominated by the Fatah movement, might be a good alternative. But this would be a mistake. Indeed, it’s arguably an impossibility.

The PA can’t even govern the areas that it is already tasked with managing, which covers most of the West Bank, including Judea and Samaria.

Born out of the 1990s Oslo Peace Process, the PA received extensive Western backing, including copious aid, for promises to renounce terrorism and recognize the Jewish state. But the PA has failed to live up to its end of the bargain. The PA pays tax-deductible salaries to those who murder and maim Jews, it names sports tournaments, streets, and schools after terrorists, and its educational and media arms celebrate terrorist attacks.

The PA is also notoriously corrupt and inept. Its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is now in the 19th year of a single elected four-year term. Abbas has imprisoned and expelled critics and dissidents, shuttered the Palestinian Legislative Council, and wielded the judiciary as a weapon. 

Worse still, members of the U.S.-trained Palestinian National Security Forces, the very entity created by Oslo to thwart terrorism, have themselves perpetrated terrorist attacks, including as recently as February 2024. Huge swaths of the West Bank, including key towns and villages, are virtually lawless, ceded to clan warfare, crime, and Fatah’s rivals. For years, Iranian proxies, including Hamas, have made inroads in areas ostensibly ruled by the PA. Abbas has repeatedly refused to hold elections due, in part, to the belief that Hamas would beat Fatah. In short: The PA itself has a crisis of legitimacy and suffers from many of the same problems, such as corruption, authoritarianism, and support for terrorism, that Gazans already deal with. The PA is incapable of ruling over the areas that it’s already tasked with overseeing. Adding a war-torn Gaza to the mix seems to be a nonstarter.

As John Hannah recently observed, there are “no perfect solutions, maybe not even any good solutions,” for postwar Gaza. Hannah is a fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and has served in senior foreign policy positions for both Democratic and Republican administrations, including national security adviser to then-Vice President Dick Cheney. He is also the chairman of the Gaza Futures Task Force, a joint project of JINSA and the Vandenberg Coalition. The task force has published a report, “The Day After: A Plan for Gaza,” which offers policymakers a way forward. 

The report recognizes reality and offers refreshingly pragmatic recommendations. It calls for the creation of an International Trust for Gaza Reconstruction to provide humanitarian assistance and help restore essential services and critical infrastructure. The trust would be funded by the U.S., allied Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and other stakeholders. And it would be an interim and independent mechanism that, as task force member Elliott Abrams noted, would provide “less politically charged means” for helping Gazans.

This latter bit is key. The task force conducted more than a hundred interviews, including with Gazans. And it found that Gazans don’t want Israel to govern, nor do they want the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority to rule. Instead, the report recommended working with relevant nongovernmental organizations, United Nations agencies, and others to “stem a “disastrous descent into anarchy,” as Hannah told journalists. An advisory council, composed of Gazans living in the enclave as well as those residing in the diaspora, would be established. Further assistance would be sought from capable national forces and Gazans vetted for ties to Hamas and other Iranian-backed proxies.

The initial objectives are simple but crucial, eschewing some of the grandiose Western ambitions that have long plagued the region in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. The trust would be tasked with restoring food, water, medicine, and housing as its first priority. A failure to ensure essential services would make stability a chimera. Restoring security goes hand in glove with these aims.

As an interim body, the trust could one day hand off power to the PA when, or if, it’s ready — or if that’s even determined to be desirable. The flexibility enabled by the task force’s recommendations should prove helpful. Ditto for its proposed composition. 

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Indeed, keeping the trust independent will not only help with its legitimacy, but it will prevent corrupt organizations such as the U.N. Relief and Works Agency from continuing in their pernicious roles. For decades, UNRWA has perpetuated the conflict, its schools teaching that the existence of the Jewish state is temporary. Hamas has used UNRWA facilities to launch attacks, and the U.N. organization has employed terrorist operatives. More recently, it’s been revealed that dozens of UNRWA employees took part in the Oct. 7 massacre, murdering Jews and taking hostages. UNRWA is part of the problem, not the solution.

The stakes are high. As Carrie Filipetti, the executive director of the Vandenberg Coalition, told me, “The destruction of Hamas would be one of the greatest achievements toward peace in the region in our lifetimes, but without efforts to provide for the governance and administration of Gaza, a new radical ideology will emerge in its place. Security is the foundation of peace in the region, and without a strategic and creative approach, I fear we will not have either.”

Sean Durns is a senior research analyst for CAMERA, the 65,000-member, Boston-based Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis.