The July 28 announcement that Beijing and Moscow will be carrying out “routine” joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in September is merely the latest indication that Beijing is firmly digging in its heels on its maritime territorial claims. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson told a news conference in Beijing that, “this is a routine exercise between the two armed forces, aimed at strengthening the developing China-Russia strategic cooperative partnership” and that it “is not directed against third parties.” But this high-profile show of strength isn’t going to fool anyone.
For those who were holding out a glimmer of hope that the July 12 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling against Beijing over the South China Sea would temper Beijing’s aggressive behavior, one thing is now crystal clear: China’s past charm offensive aimed at Southeast Asia is as dead as a door-nail. Beijing has chosen the role of schoolyard bully over the mantle of being regarded as a “responsible stakeholder” by the international community.
Chinese president Xi Jinping, not surprisingly, forcefully insisted that his country’s “territorial sovereignty and marine rights” would not be affected by the ruling. The People’s Daily asserted in an editorial that the Hague ruling “ignored basic truths” and that “the Chinese government and the Chinese people will neither acknowledge nor accept” the ruling. The Diplomat reported on July 16th that Chinese netizens had begun a consorted campaign on the internet against the ruling: “[M]any Chinese celebrities started to post pictures and comments on Weibo and Instagram supporting the nine-dash line and China’s ultimate ownership of South China Sea… [and] retweeted images bearing slogans like: “China: We cannot lose a single inch [of territory]” and “China’s territorial sovereignty doesn’t need others to arbitrate.”
With nationalist ire, partly of its own making, reaching a boiling point, Beijing had little choice but to turn the smile of its previous regional charm offensive into a fang-toothed grimace. At a mid-July Asia-Europe meeting summit in Mongolia, Chinese premier Li Keqiang blew right past the Philippine foreign minister to deliver a curt warning to regional rival Japan.
Li reportedly told Japanese prime minister Abe that “Japan is not a state directly involved in the South China Sea issue, and thus should exercise caution in its own words and deeds, and stop hyping up and interfering.” Abe responded by issuing a statement with Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc that the ruling “must be observed.” Beijing has further upped the ante by having its state media announce on July 15th that, “China aims to launch a series of offshore nuclear power platforms to promote development in the South China Sea. Experts said little progress had been made on the plan, which would likely stoke further tensions.”
Beijing’s next move on the diplomatic front was to enlist its client state of Cambodia to undermine a July 25th ASEAN joint communique by omitting any mention at all of the PCA ruling last month. This was regardless of the fact that the court’s decision was the direct result of the petition of an ASEAN member and has a clear bearing on regional maritime interests. Beijing had already laid the groundwork at the earlier ASEM meeting in Mongolia. The Chinese foreign ministry reported that Premier Li addressed the issue of the South China Sea with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has long been seen as being in Beijing’s back pocket. Hun Sen reportedly told Li that Cambodia would uphold a “fair and objective stance” on the South China Sea issue and work to maintain friendly China-ASEAN relations.
China further greased the wheels by offering Cambodia a new $600 million aid package on the eve of an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Vientiane. That apparently sealed the deal. The Associated Press later recounted the sordid details of how Cambodia and the meeting’s host, Laos, worked together to ensure that no mention of the PCA ruling was contained in the joint communique. The AP observed: “Daring to take on China in a territorial dispute in the South China Sea, the Philippines went to an international tribunal for justice, and won big. But it turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. Beijing came back with such ferocity and manipulative diplomacy that other Southeast Asian countries that have similar disputes with it are apparently backing down.”
Cambodian strongman Hun Sen and his underlings have been shameless in defending their actions in undermining ASEAN consensus on this hot button issue. The Cambodia Daily reported that “Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman Chum Sounry on Wednesday (July 28) denied that Cambodia had blocked a reference to a U.N.-backed tribunal’s ruling against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea in Monday’s joint ASEAN statement—and said the omission was, in fact, the Philippines’ decision.”
Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Manila from Vientiane just after the conclusion of the ASEAN meeting in a show of support for Washington’s Philippine ally. Seeking to make lemonade out of a lemon, Kerry said that he was “very satisfied” that Southeast Asian countries could issue a joint communique that championed the rule of law, and its omission of reference to an arbitration case on the South China Sea “did not detract from its importance.” Kerry has termed Beijing’s rejection of the PCA ruling as “illegitimate.”
Kerry also stated that he supports resumption of bilateral talks between the Philippines and China on the South China Sea issue, something the new Philippine president’s predecessor was reluctant to do. The new president Rodrigo Duterte, who has declared that “war is not an option,” has struck a more conciliatory tone toward Beijing than his predecessor. He has announced plans to send former President Ramos as a special envoy to Beijing to discuss the maritime dispute. Duterte is walking a fine line, however, and must not appear over accommodating to Beijing, given the strong nationalist feelings on the streets of his country.
Thus, the state of play includes: a planned joint Sino-Russian naval exercise, a public warning to Tokyo, the successful blocking of an ASEAN statement on the matter, and the agreement of Manila to enter into tentative bilateral negotiations on the South China Sea.
Does anyone seriously think that Beijing is in a mood for compromise?
Dennis P. Halpin, a former adviser on Asian issues to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute (SAIS) and an adviser to the Poblete Analysis Group.
