THE U.S.-TAIWAN relationship is on life support. Over nearly seven years of concurrent presidencies under George W. Bush and Chen Shui-bian, the bilateral relationship has deteriorated to the point that Bush has repeatedly rebuked Chen, either publicly or through emissaries, over perceived broken promises and for “provoking” Beijing by trying to consolidate the country’s de facto independence. The approaching March 2008 presidential election in Taiwan offers an opportunity for Washington and Taipei to begin mending the bilateral relationship, and also for the leading Taiwanese candidates to propose positive visions for future U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Today, Taiwanese politics are split into two main camps divided on the essential question of Taiwan’s fate: the “pan-blue” coalition of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the People’s First Party seek eventual reunification with mainland China, while the “pan-green” coalition of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union work toward permanent Taiwanese independence. In each coalition, the latter, smaller partner advocates the more radical version of their respective platforms, while the KMT and DPP compete for the decisive middle segment of Taiwanese voters who favor maintaining the “status quo” for the foreseeable future.
For a brief spell last year, it appeared that the 2008 election was headed for a landslide victory by the KMT. Then-Taipei mayor and presumptive KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou was riding high in public polls. A spring trip to Washington, where he was feted by American officials and China hands, seemingly confirmed his status as Washington’s preferred candidate. Ma’s pledge to seek closer economic and political ties with Beijing promised to cool down tensions in the Taiwan Strait, where many Americans feel a conflict would drag the United States into a war on behalf of the island’s independence movement.
But just as Mayor Ma sealed his image of electoral invincibility late last year, he found himself the subject of an inquiry on the misuse of the city’s special expenses account, leading to his February 2007 indictment for corruption. Although Ma used the day of his indictment as an opportunity to declare his bid for the presidency–the popular vote being the ultimate acquittal, he explained–the uncertainty surrounding his fate has thrown the 2008 presidential race wide open. And here in Washington, there are new doubts as to whether Ma is the right man for the job after all. First, there is Ma’s anti-Japanese rhetoric, which complicates security relations with our most important East Asian ally. But equally problematic is Ma’s failure to put an end to his party’s legislative strategy of filibustering defense spending bills necessary to purchase the major American defense systems offered by President Bush since 2001.
The first test of the 2008 election is playing itself out now as the KMT and DPP have formally selected their presidential nominees. For the KMT, Ma sailed to an easy victory last week. The DPP had a wider field in the primary: Vice President Annette Lu, Premier Su Tseng-chang, DPP chairman Yu Shyi-kun, and former Kaosheng mayor and premier Frank Hsieh. Hsieh’s win in the May 6 party-members’ vote led both perceived-frontrunner Su and Chairman Yu to drop out, leaving only the long-shot Lu to make a nominal contest of the May 10, open straw poll that should confirm Hsieh’s candidacy.
After almost eight years of tension between Washington and Taipei over President Chen’s efforts to expand Taiwan’s “independent space,” the question of whether or not the next DPP candidate takes a more nuanced attitude toward U.S.-Taiwanese relations is critical and has received tremendous attention from Foggy Bottom and Asia watchers. By far, the most contentious questions are what positions the candidates take on the question of “constitutional revision” and the “four no’s,” a pledge by President Chen in 2000 not to take measures that could clear the way for de jure independence.
Reflecting the need to appeal to the DPP’s base, all of the DPP candidates appeared poised to break away from the “four no’s” and to pursue constitutional revision–a step that will undoubtedly generate fresh concerns here in Washington. Nevertheless, Hsieh, who was Su’s predecessor as the Taiwanese premier, used the primary competition to set out the most pragmatic view on the challenges that have divided the country’s body politic, denouncing the ongoing “democratic civil war” that has wrought the country under the Chen administration. His best known, and most controversial, view is his acknowledgement that the Republic of China Constitution is a straightforward “one-China” document under which the Taiwanese president serves. Although Hsieh argues that he would set to rectify what he describes as an obvious absurdity in such an arrangement, he acknowledges that it can only be done in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and in a manner that does not give Beijing an excuse to attack the island.
In fact, arguably, it was Vice President Lu and Chairman Yu’s unwillingness to adopt more moderate language that contributed to their unsuccessful campaigns. Each is associated with the most ardent pro-independence positions of their party, with Lu having recently published a book calling for Taiwan’s independence and Yu declaring that Taipei should not bow to Washington’s pressure to maintain the so-called “status quo.” These stances cost them support over time as voters seem to be looking for administrative competence rather than fiery political rhetoric in their candidates this time around.
More broadly and not widely recognized by Washington policymakers is the fact that the democratic logic of Taiwan’s politics tends to push both major political parties to the center. Although most Taiwanese now consider themselves Taiwanese–not Chinese–and their country independent, most are not interested in provoking a crisis that might undermine the existing peace.
While Chinese diplomats warn that President Chen will throw cross-Strait relations into chaos by leaping toward independence before leaving office, the need for Chen’s party to run a viable presidential campaign in 2008 provides the essential brake on any such dramatic maneuver. In similar fashion, even though many in the KMT leadership would like to see unification talks as a policy priority, KMT politicians can’t win a national election on that basis. The party’s appeal is based on the view that it can foster calmer relations with the mainland, not that it can bring about a formal reconciliation between Beijing and Taipei. Hence, Ma has even acknowledged that Taiwan’s ultimate independence is an acceptable outcome, if that is what the Taiwanese people ultimately choose.
Undoubtedly, during the campaign Hsieh will suggest that Ma is the candidate of a party that doesn’t love Taiwan–that he heads a party whose heart lies with the mainland. Given the polling numbers on Taiwanese identity these days, Hsieh would be foolish not to play that card to some degree.
That said, both Hsieh and Ma’s nominations indicate that the Taiwanese public is more keen to hear about recommendations for competent governance and economic growth than orations in support of independence or unification. Although Hsieh hails from the “deep green” city of Kaohsiung, he won 40 percent of the popular vote in “deep blue” Taipei during the 2006 mayoral contest, even after Ma had successfully run the city for eight years. Responding to the demands for efficient government resonates most loudly in the Taiwanese body politic, and that is the campaign theme that both Hsieh and Ma are likely to pursue.
At the moment, Hsieh trails Ma in the polls. But since the election itself doesn’t take place until March 2008, there is no way to predict who will win. And with Ma’s indictment hanging over the race, there is even more uncertainty.
From the outside, Taiwan’s politics often seem chaotic, characterized more by the occasional legislators’ fist fight than the orderly process of casting votes. Yet American policymakers would do themselves a favor by stepping back and seeing that Taiwan is going through the rather predictable growing pains of almost all young democracies. Its one-time dissident party is learning that it needs to be able to govern, not just right old wrongs; and its one-time ruling party is learning that it pays a political price for refusing to play the role of a loyal opposition. It’s not a pretty process, but Taiwan is headed in the right direction this presidential election year.
Chris Griffin is a research fellow and Gary Schmitt is resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
