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We are a long way from 1945. But not as far as we might think. The dangers of another great power conflict have never been greater. But foe and friend alike have changed. And the United States’s approach to the world must change with it. As President Abraham Lincoln said at the dawn of another cataclysmic war, “As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.”
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More than eight decades after World War II, Germany and Japan are once again rearming. And while this has sparked everything from consternation in some quarters to internet memes, it is not only a good thing — it is essential. The world, and America’s place in it, will be safer as a result.
At first glance, the concerns aren’t surprising. After all, World War II was the most destructive in history and left a lasting and terrible imprint.
At war’s end, more than 60 million people were dead, many of them civilians. Both Germany and Japan were in shambles, their populations and lands ravaged by war’s destruction. The U.S. and its allies awakened to a new threat and created a new national security architecture to forestall Soviet aggression.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was built to keep “the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” as its first secretary general, Pugs Ismay, famously quipped.
Concerns about Russia remain. Many Europeans continue to press for U.S. involvement on their continent. But the idea of “keeping the Germans down” is no longer sensible or advisable.
To understand why, one must understand that we live in a very different world from 1945.
Back then, the U.S. dominated the global economy, accounting for nearly half of the world’s GDP. America printed the preeminent global currency and was the dominant manufacturing power. Europe, western Europe in particular, was the other industrial center of gravity.
Today, the Indo-Pacific region accounts for the majority of the world’s GDP. The dollar’s hold has slipped, and China, not the U.S., is the factory of the world. The U.S. has some catching up to do, and fast.
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Beijing has been engaged in the largest military buildup in modern history. China seeks to supplant the U.S. as the sole superpower. To do so, the Middle Kingdom will first have to become the dominant power in the Pacific, vanquishing the U.S. in the process. Such an event would dramatically change the lives of everyday Americans, and American power, forever.
To forestall this possibility, the U.S. needs strong and capable allies. As Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of war for policy, memorably put it, America needs “partnerships, not dependencies.” Both Germany and Japan will be essential if the U.S. carries out what noted foreign policy scholar A. Wess Mitchell, a principal at the Marathon Initiative and a former assistant secretary of state, has called a “grand strategy of consolidation.”
On April 22, the German government announced a new military strategy that seems to take into account these new global realities.
As German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius noted, “We are developing the Bundeswehr into the strongest conventional army in Europe. In the short term, we are increasing our defense and resilience, in the medium term, we are aiming for a significant increase in overarching capabilities, and in the long term, we will establish technological superiority.”
The strategy envisions a phased buildup of German military power over the next decade and calls for a major personnel expansion, from a current strength of 185,000 active-duty soldiers to at least 460,000 active and nonactive troops. The projected spending represents a 36-year high for the country. For the first time since 1990, Germany is now spending more than 2% of its GDP on defense.
Japan has also undertaken new measures. In late April, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi both inaugurated a new panel to review her country’s defense and security policies and scrapped restrictions on lethal weapons imports.
Tokyo has also focused more on defense.
In December 2022, Japan announced it would be doubling its defense spending to 2% of its GDP by 2027 — an objective it has since met. For its part, Germany has announced a target of 3.5% of its GDP on defense by 2029.
The Trump administration has called on NATO allies to increase their defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by 2035. Some have made great strides in this regard, while others, such as the Spanish government of Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, have outright refused.
The administration’s decision to prioritize burden sharing reflects an increasingly complex threat environment. It also reflects reality.
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The Pentagon has called China the sole “pacing challenge.” Beijing’s military and industrial power dwarfs that of previous opponents, including Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union. Facing it will require the U.S. to concentrate its full strategic attention. And it requires allies to do their fair share.
Indeed, China isn’t the only danger. North Korea, Iran, and Russia all present significant challenges to the U.S. and its interests and partners. And by dint of both geography and ambition, some of these revisionist powers pose an even more pressing and immediate challenge to American allies worldwide.
North Korea, for example, explicitly seeks to “reunify” the Korean peninsula. Russian President Vladimir Putin hopes to reconstitute the czarist empire of old. And Iran seeks the destruction of Israel and the end of the Gulf monarchies.
It is in the interest of both the U.S. and its allies to prevent these fever dreams. But the U.S. can’t care more about the security of its allies than the allies themselves.
By working with and compelling partners to increase their share of the defense burden, the U.S. will be able to better concentrate its energies and focus on the Indo-Pacific while simultaneously ensuring the durability and long-term sustainability of its various alliances and partnerships.
As Pistorius said, NATO must become “more European” in order to remain trans-Atlantic. European partners must continue to step up on the continent. Ditto for our allies elsewhere. Some, such as Berlin, have made great strides in doing so: an accomplishment of the Trump administration that has largely gone overlooked. Others must be incentivized to do more.
Indeed, this will restore a balance that has been missing in the U.S.’s relations with its friends and partners.
Germany has long played a central role in both European and world history. Japan has occupied a similar position in its part of the world. Both are economically powerful and technologically advanced. That their military power hasn’t matched their economic potential is a historical aberration.
During the Cold War, for example, West Germany was a crucial part of NATO’s strategy to deter and, if need be, confront the Soviet menace. The low levels of defense spending that followed the Cold War’s end stand in stark contrast to the preceding decades.
West Germany’s defense spending had once exceeded 4% of its GDP, but fell to as low as 1% in the post-Cold War era. That decline, enabled for years by a U.S. unwilling to change the failing status quo, is now being reversed. But with Chinese President Xi Jinping calling for his forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, more must be done.
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In short, the U.S. should want a strong Germany and a strong Japan. And both nations should want the ability to protect their interests, too.
In the scope of history, the state of affairs that followed the Cold War was unnatural. It was most certainly unsustainable. And it is wholly incompatible with the world we face today — and the one we hope to build.
