The more one delves into the details of the Islamabad memorandum of understanding, the clearer it becomes that this is not the “unconditional surrender” of Iran that President Donald Trump has claimed. It is, however, close to an unconditional surrender, but not by Iran.
The details have now been fully mooted and need not all be sickeningly repeated here. It suffices to say that if American negotiators are dense enough to proceed for the entire 60 days of possible negotiations, all will have been lost because of upfront concessions, whether a final deal is reached in 60 days. Indeed, because of that unfortunate structure, Iran is not incentivized to reach an agreement anywhere near that which the administration touts.
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Why? Because the memorandum provides that certain paragraphs are to be implemented immediately, before proceeding to a final agreement on all other issues. Keep this in mind: If America quickly sees that any one of these “gateway” paragraphs cannot be resolved consistently with our security, it will compel, we contend, America to immediately cease negotiations. Moreover, if it quickly becomes clear that our critical nuclear goals cannot be resolved, the primary focus for America, we can also cease negotiations, even though the nuclear issue is not one of the five paragraphs requiring early commencement.
THE EMPEROR’S NUCLEAR CLOTHES: TRUMP IRAN DEAL AND THE NAKED KING
Per Paragraph 13, the final negotiations are to occur only after “the beginning of the implementation of Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11.” These five paragraphs are all benefits to Iran: 1) termination of all hostilities, including “in Lebanon,” and “ensuring … territorial integrity of Lebanon”; 4) removal of the U.S. blockade; 5) Iran’s “demining” of the Strait of Hormuz, but only within 30 days, whereupon Iran can charge “fees” after 60 days; 10) waivers on the sale of Iranian crude oil and all banking restrictions; and 11) U.S. to make fully available all frozen assets and restricted funds (these total as much as $120 billion).
Obviously, at the outset, the U.S. gives all and gets nothing, while Iran gets rich and restrains Israel. All of this is before agreeing to anything the U.S. wants, other than a brief opening of the Strait of Hormuz.
So, how do we get out of this absurd deal both quickly and legally? First, Israel can help by continuing, as is its sovereign right, to fight Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Israel does this, we can claim that the deal is off per gateway paragraph (1). And if Hezbollah can be claimed to institute hostilities, that is also a principled deal-breaker. Indeed, Iran now claims a breach, to which we can accede, and exit.
A more fundamental problem arises under gateway paragraphs (10) and (11), allowing the sale of Iranian oil, removal of banking restrictions, and the unfreezing of frozen assets. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 requires congressional review of any agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program, including sanctions relief. The president thus does not solely possess a waiver authority. This restriction alone can be a basis to tell Iran, sorry, no ability to sell its oil without sanctions or banking restrictions.
But there is likely to be a more fundamental, irresolvable conflict caused by the obstinacy of Iran, which must act in good faith. Paragraph 8, albeit not an “early” resolution paragraph, is the key “out” of the memorandum. This paragraph states the “critical importance of the [nuclear] issues above mentioned.” The parties must promise to “immediately address these issues.” All “disposition of stockpiled enriched material” will be “mutually agreed upon.”
But it is already quite clear, thankfully, that Iran will quickly douse any hope that it will give up all its enriched uranium, or allow a fulsome regime of surprise inspections to monitor compliance. Accordingly, since Iran will balk at this crucial prong, we can exit as soon as the first “no way” is uttered by Iranian negotiators.
America is not required, as is true in any negotiation, to refrain from exercising the “walk option” quickly, when it becomes clear that the matter cannot be resolved satisfactorily. Any person with common sense, or any law student who did not flunk first semester contracts, would know that this “agreement to agree” can be terminated at any time, especially through disagreement on a material term of acknowledged “critical importance.” Mediation often ends when an impasse seems clear.
Vice President JD Vance must by now know that if he does not push for an exit, he can kiss his presidential ambitions goodbye. And Trump should not be vulnerable to being labeled John Kerry’s dumber, weaker, more foolish brother.
WILL IRAN INVITE TRUMP TO ITS VICTORY CELEBRATION?
The deal, if “implemented” as Iran suggests, will end up with America begging, in 60 days, Iran to allow us, pretty please, to allow U.N. inspectors to inspect “downblending” of enriched uranium on site in Iran.
To all American officials involved in the present negotiation: Get us out of this deal, or get out.
John D. O’Connor is a former federal prosecutor and the San Francisco attorney who represented W. Mark Felt during his revelation as Deep Throat in 2005. O’Connor is the author of the books Postgate: How the Washington Post Betrayed Deep Throat, Covered Up Watergate and Began Today’s Partisan Advocacy Journalism and The Mysteries of Watergate: What Really Happened. O’Connor and Mark Felt also collaborated on the 2006 book, A G-Man’s Life.
