The State Department portrays the Erdogan-Sisi rapprochement as a “diplomatic victory” that will “calm” the Eastern Mediterranean. The record shows the opposite. Two of the region’s largest conventional militaries are now training together while Ankara embeds Turkish defense production inside Egypt’s armed forces.
In September 2025, Turkish and Egyptian warships conducted their first joint naval exercise in 13 years. “Friendship of the Sea” ran for five days in the Eastern Mediterranean and included frigates, fast-attack craft, submarines, and Turkish F-16 support. In June 2026, the two air forces followed with multiday combat training across multiple Egyptian bases, using F-16s for coordinated operations. Turkish and Egyptian special forces had already trained together in Ankara the previous April. These were not courtesy calls. Together, they field well over 750,000 active personnel backed by substantial armored, naval, and air forces.
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The industrial component is even more consequential. During Erdogan’s February 2026 visit to Cairo, Turkey’s state-owned MKE signed a $350 million defense package with Egypt’s Ministry of Defense. It includes a $130 million sale of the Tolga short-range air-defense system, built to destroy drones and low-flying threats, plus new Egyptian production lines for 155 mm artillery shells and smaller-caliber ammunition. Local manufacturing gives Cairo sustainment independence while locking Turkish technical standards and supply chains into one of the Arab world’s largest armies. Eighteen separate agreements on defense, trade, and investment were signed at the same meeting.
The irony is unmistakable. Abdel Fattah el Sisi rose to power by leading the 2013 coup that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from government in Egypt. Yet his administration has signed a defense agreement with Erdogan’s Turkey that will establish Turkish production lines for artillery ammunition and air defense inside Egypt. These interdependent chains will give Ankara lasting influence over Egyptian military logistics that outlasts any political moment.
Bilateral trade now stands at roughly $9 billion annually, with Egypt as Turkey’s largest African trading partner. Both governments have set an explicit target of $15 billion. These figures are not background noise. They fund and justify the military relationship. Ankara gains markets and leverage. Cairo gains systems and industrial offsets without the political conditions sometimes attached to traditional suppliers. The money flows in both directions, creating commercial constituencies that favor deeper ties and underwriting the capabilities now on display in joint drills.
The result is a new conventional pole in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. Joint training sharply increases the speed at which these forces can operate together. Joint production reduces Egypt’s dependence on any single external supplier while giving Turkey a manufacturing foothold inside a major regional army. This combination did not exist two years ago. What is emerging is a pragmatic axis built on mutual interest in power projection and industrial self-sufficiency rather than shared ideology.
IRAN AND TURKEY WANT THE MIDDLE EAST. ONE COUNTRY STANDS IN THEIR WAY
This axis strengthens Turkey’s regional position while complicating NATO planning along its southern flank and raising new risks for U.S. partners working to maintain stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The State Department’s portrayal of the Erdogan-Sisi rapprochement as a geopolitical achievement is contradicted by the record. Turkey’s deepening military integration with Egypt through joint training and local defense production is especially concerning because Ankara has repeatedly proven it is not a reliable NATO partner. It operates Russian S-400 systems that threaten alliance interoperability and has provided sustained political and material support to Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization. Washington must stop celebrating this development and treat the emerging axis as a strategic setback that demands urgent policy recalibration — before Turkey further embeds its influence inside another major Arab military.
Jose Lev Alvarez is an American–Israeli scholar specializing in international security policy. A multilingual veteran of the IDF special forces and the U.S. Army, he holds three master’s degrees, a medical degree, and is completing a Ph.D. in Intelligence and Global Security in the Washington, D.C., area.
