Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan survived Russia’s best efforts to influence this month’s election against him. That allows Pashinyan to continue guiding his small South Caucasus nation’s Westward turn. Still, he lacks the decisive mandate needed to finalize peace with longtime foe Azerbaijan, and Moscow retains multiple levers of power to keep Yerevan trapped in Russia’s sphere of influence.
The vote was always more than a domestic contest. After Azerbaijan trounced Armenian forces in the 2020 and 2023 conflicts over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, Pashinyan charted a sharp break with Armenia’s nominal ally, Russia. Yerevan instead turned toward the United States and Europe while seeking to make peace with Baku. This culminated in a historic August 2025 meeting at the White House, where the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders initialed a framework agreement aimed at ending decades of conflict.
Recommended Stories
On June 7, Armenians voted to maintain that course. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party secured 49.81% of the vote, giving it 64 seats in the 105-member National Assembly. The leading opposition party, Strong Armenia, backed by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, came in second with 23.27% and 29 seats. Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance, which also favors close ties with Russia, took 12 seats.
AZERBAIJAN ISN’T ARMING TO INVADE ARMENIA — IT’S ARMING TO SURVIVE RUSSIA AND IRAN
The most immediate constraint is arithmetic. As a condition for signing a final peace treaty, Azerbaijan insists that Armenia amend its constitution to excise language related to Armenian territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh. To put a constitutional amendment to a national referendum, parliament must first approve it by a two-thirds majority. Civil Contract’s 64 seats fall short. Pashinyan can seek coalition partners, but the pro-Russian parties will fight him.
Even if Pashinyan were to find the votes, Russia would no doubt seek to sway the referendum’s results. Moscow will have fertile ground to work in, as many Armenians who back the Western turn still aren’t ready to surrender the constitutional claim to Karabakh.
The scale of Russian interference during the parliamentary election offers a preview of what a referendum campaign could look like. Russian information-warfare units descended on Armenia unusually early, garnering tens of millions of views on posts and articles smearing Pashinyan. The Armenian Apostolic Church also became part of the pressure campaign, as opposition figures and pro-Kremlin networks used Pashinyan’s confrontation with senior clergy to cast his Western turn as an attack on Armenian identity, tradition, and national survival.
After the election, Russian state media immediately portrayed the outcome as illegitimate. Moscow claimed the vote was marred by Western interference and “unprecedented pressure” on the opposition, while Russian state media amplified allegations of repression and fraud. Strong Armenia demanded annulment, while Kocharyan’s alliance vowed to challenge the outcome.
Except for Belarus, few post-Soviet states remain as economically, energetically, militarily, and politically tied to Moscow as Armenia does. That’s why Yerevan’s Western turn matters so much to Russia — and why it will be so difficult to complete.
Even after bilateral trade fell from $12.4 billion in 2024 to $7.7 billion in 2025, Russia still accounts for roughly one-third of Armenia’s total foreign trade. Russian state energy giant Gazprom controls Armenia’s gas transmission and distribution network, and Russia supplies 85% of its gas and 62% of its petroleum products. The Metsamor nuclear plant, which generates around 40% of Armenia’s electricity, depends on the Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom for life-extension work running until 2036.
Moscow is already attempting to exploit its economic leverage. Ahead of the June 7 vote, Russia imposed sweeping restrictions on Armenian exports. Moscow promptly expanded those measures after the election. The Kremlin has also threatened to revoke Armenia’s preferential price for Russian gas, noting that European market rates are far higher.
In May, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned Armenia to decide “as early as possible” whether it wants to leave the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union for the European Union, invoking Ukraine as a warning of what awaits countries that make the wrong choice. Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri houses roughly 3,500 troops when at full strength. Although Pashinyan has frozen Armenia’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the base operates under a separate bilateral treaty that runs until 2044.
What’s more, Russia now has a political lever inside parliament. Karapetyan’s 29 seats and Kocharyan’s 12 give Moscow a platform it can use to obstruct or dilute the constitutional changes needed for peace with Azerbaijan and to slow Armenia’s Western trajectory.
Pashinyan went into this election with both President Donald Trump’s endorsement and Europe’s backing. Washington and Brussels must now help Armenia defend what it just voted for.
TRUMP’S VISION OF PEACE THROUGH PROSPERITY HAS A PLACE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Armenia needs a credible economic alternative to Russian dependency. In response to Russian economic coercion, the European Union has promised Armenia a $57 million emergency support package. That’s a good first step, but it is not enough: Armenia needs genuine trade diversification. Washington and Brussels also should actively back independent civil society and media, Armenia’s first line of defense against Russia’s information machine.
Pashinyan won an important battle in Armenia’s effort to break free of Moscow’s sphere of influence. But the war is far from over, and Armenia cannot win it alone.
Keti Korkiya is a research analyst in the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
