Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran’s former foreign minister and a current member of parliament, has proposed attacking an American military base, capturing 100 U.S. personnel, and transporting them to Iran. The statement was not an operational order, but it exposed Tehran’s theory of victory: use American hostages to seize control of American decision-making.
President Donald Trump has already resumed strikes and reimposed a naval blockade after renewed Iranian attacks on commercial shipping and American positions. If Iran attempts a mass abduction, another limited round of bombing would be insufficient. Tehran would be changing the purpose of the war, and Washington should change its objective in return.
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Trump should announce that any state-directed attempt to capture American personnel will end the effort to alter Iranian behavior. American policy would become the removal of the regime responsible. The message should be unmistakable: Take one American, lose the regime.
That doctrine should begin with a military quarantine of the economic and logistical assets keeping the Islamic Republic alive. The United States should deny Tehran the use of its oil terminals, ports, commercial shipping, and military positions around the Strait of Hormuz, isolating the regime from the revenue and movement it needs to survive.
Kharg Island should sit at the center of that pressure. Roughly 90% of Iran’s crude exports move through Kharg, making it the regime’s most important economic pressure point. American forces should isolate the island, halt loading operations, and secure its port and energy infrastructure while preserving those facilities for a post-regime Iran.
Iranian and Revolutionary Guard forces captured during recovery operations should be held as prisoners of war until every American is returned and the command structure responsible for the abduction is dismantled. Tehran should understand that an attempt to manufacture American hostages would instead place its own personnel, assets, and freedom of movement under American and allied control.
Regional partners should be required to help contain the conflict. Gulf governments hosting American forces should provide access to bases, ports, and airspace, close Revolutionary Guard commercial networks, and integrate their intelligence and defensive capabilities with U.S. operations. Turkey and Azerbaijan can help restrict Iranian military movement near the Caucasus without turning the campaign into an open-ended ground invasion.
Military pressure should be paired with a campaign to fracture the regime’s political and security command. The U.S. should disable command centers, communications networks, and Revolutionary Guard units directly involved in any hostage operation. Officials responsible should face targeted capture or prosecution when feasible.
The objective would not be to occupy Tehran or storm symbolic institutions. It would be to prevent the regime from coordinating a prolonged hostage crisis, collapse the chain of command behind it, and make clear that those directing the operation cannot hide behind government offices.
Individualized surrender terms would give commanders, pilots, intelligence officers, diplomats, and senior civil servants a clear choice. Those who refuse unlawful orders, provide intelligence, assist captured Americans, or transfer key facilities would receive protection and relocation for their families. Those who remain loyal to the hostage operation would lose their assets, foreign sanctuary, and any place in Iran’s political future.
Washington must also prepare for what follows by assembling a temporary Iranian transition authority composed of opposition figures, technocrats, former officials, military defectors, and representatives of Iran’s major communities. Frozen assets could sustain hospitals, public salaries, energy infrastructure, and food distribution during the transition. The goal is to dismantle the Islamic Republic without repeating the Iraq mistake of destroying the state beneath it.
The same doctrine would impose a clear test on America’s allies. NATO members and regional partners would be judged by what they contribute: deployable forces, basing access, intelligence, sanctions enforcement, munitions production, and operational support. Countries that decline to help cannot expect the same military presence, intelligence access, or procurement advantages from the U.S.
A unified congressional mandate would be essential to recover Americans, enforce the quarantine, compel allied burden-sharing, and prepare for an Iranian transition. Such an authorization would keep pressure in place until every American is returned and the regime responsible can no longer govern through hostage-taking.
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Mottaki’s proposal assumes that American concern for its citizens will restrain American power. Trump should reverse that calculation. An attempted hostage operation should put Iran’s revenue, military mobility, political leadership, and governing regime at risk.
The Islamic Republic can abandon the idea of seizing Americans, or discover that the first American it attempts to take will be the last strategic mistake the regime ever makes.
Colton Overcash is the founder of Vertex Strategies, a government relations and strategic advisory firm based in Charlotte with a presence in Washington, D.C. He previously served in a presidential appointment at the Department of Homeland Security under the Trump administration, worked in a sensitive role at the Pentagon, and is a former congressional staffer.
